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This research investigates the role of emotion in the persuasion process by 
establishing a novel relationship between emotion and construal level. Built on cognitive 
appraisal theories, this research proposes that the certainty appraisal components of 
emotions exert a direct influence on an individual’s representation of information at a 
high versus low construal level.  
The findings indicate that individuals primed to feel emotion low on certainty 
appraisals construe behaviors or events at a high level and estimate uncertain events as 
more likely to happen, while those primed to feel emotion high on certainty appraisals 
characterize behavior or events at a low level and evaluate uncertain events as less likely 
to occur (Study 1 & Study 2). Further, such a fit (vs. nonfit) between an individual’s 
 vii 
emotional state and the construal level at which product benefits in an advertising 
message are represented lead to a more favorable evaluation of the message and product 
(Study 3). The findings from this dissertation study also illustrate that uncertainty-related 
emotion eliciting a high-level construal mindset leads to a cognitive shift toward relying 
more on nonalignable attribute differences and a greater preference for the nonalignable-
better brand although individuals usually rely more on alignable attribute differences and 
favor the alignable-better brand (Study 4). Accordingly, these outcomes occur because 
the certainty appraisal components of emotions influence mental construal levels.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
How does emotion come to influence a consumer’s response to an advertising 
message? The role of emotion in the persuasion process has been an important inquiry in 
advertising research. A wealth of literature has documented that the emotion of message 
recipients exerts an influence on their message processing and judgment in a systematic 
rather than an irrational manner (Batra and Ray 1986; Cohen, Pham, and Andrade, 2008; 
Holbrook and Batra, 1987; Hullett, 2005). The majority of the research studies on the 
impact of emotions on advertising evaluation have been rooted in the valence-based 
framework contrasting the differential impacts of positive versus negative emotion. The 
research findings within the valence-based framework suggest that different feelings of 
the same valence exert similar influences on cognitive processing and judgment (Mackie 
and Worth, 1989). However, this approach is not without criticism. 
An increasing number of researchers have questioned the assumption that all 
positive and all negative emotions are equal and lead to similar effects on message 
processing and judgment (e.g., Babin, Darden, and Barbin, 1998; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, 
and Kramer, 1994; DeSteno et al., 2000; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Raghunathan and 
Pham, 1999; Tiedens and Linton, 2001). The central idea behind this research stream is 
that isolable emotions can be distinctively identifiable because individuals experience 
specific emotions based on their evaluations and interpretations of emotion-related events 
(Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985, 
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1987). From this more appraisal-focused perspective, hope and happiness, both positive 
in valence, differ notably on various cognitive appraisals such as certainty, expectedness, 
importance, and controllability (e.g., Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz, 1994; Smith and 
Ellsworth, 1985).  
Furthermore, a growing body of evidence within this appraisal framework shows 
that different emotions of the same global valence exert distinct influences on subsequent 
cognitive processing, judgment, and behavior (e.g., DeSteno et al., 2000; Lerner and 
Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Tiedens and Linton, 2001). For instance, 
DeSteno et al. (2000) showed that sadness and anger, which are distinct but negative, 
have a different influence on likelihood estimates in an emotion-specific manner. In 
particular, sad individuals believe that sad events are more likely to occur than angering 
ones, whereas angry individuals believe angering events to be more likely than sad ones 
(DeSteno et al, 2000) In addition, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) found that individuals 
primed to feel anxious pursue uncertainty reduction and favor a low-risk/low-reward 
option, whereas individuals primed to feel sad seek reward replacement and favor a high-
risk/high-reward option. These research results clearly indicate that different emotions of 
the same valence can have a different impact on cognitive processing, judgment, and 
choice.  
In line with this research approach, a recent stream of research has also 
investigated the effects of different emotions of the same global valence on the 
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processing of advertising messages (e.g., Faseur and Geuens, 2006; Griskevicius et al., 
2009; Yan, Dillard, and Shen, 2012). The research findings have consistently identified 
that different emotions of the same valence have different impacts on consumers’ 
responses to advertising messages in an emotion-specific way. Nevertheless, important 
questions still remain about whether and how consumers in specific emotional states 
encode and evaluate advertising messages featuring product attributes and related 
benefits in general and abstract versus specific and concrete ways.  
Previous research efforts on the persuasive effects of emotions have employed the 
dual-processing framework, suggesting that individuals in a negative emotion engage in 
more systematic and elaborative processing, whereas those in a positive emotion engage 
in heuristic processing due to deficits in motivation and ability (Bohner et al, 1992; 
Mackie and Worth, 1989). However, the research findings within the dual-processing 
framework do not provide appropriate explanations about the effects of emotions on 
consumer evaluations of advertising messages featuring product benefits and attributes in 
different ways.  
Specifically, some advertising messages may focus on desired end states 
consumers arrive in by using the advertised products, but other advertising messages may 
put a more functional emphasis on feasible attributes the advertised products provide 
(Lee, Keller, and Sternthal, 2010; Trope and Liberman, 2010). For instance, an ad 
message for an elliptical trainer can focus on health benefits (e.g., heart healthy, 
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cardiovascular conditioning, bone strengthening, and lung capacity) while another 
advertising message may describe how specific features work for helping burn calories 
(e.g., 7 workout programs to keep you challenged, grip heart rate monitor). Further, in a 
comparative advertising context, ad appeals can include features that are comparable 
along the same dimension (i.e., alignable differences) while other appeals may focus on 
unique features of the advertised brands that do not correspond with those of competing 
brands (i.e., nonalignable differences) (Zhang and Markman 1998). For instance, an ad 
message for a vacuum cleaner may highlight different but comparable attributes (e.g., 
2.5L vs. 2.25L dust collection capacity), whereas, another message for a competing 
cleaner may emphasize unique and non-comparable attributes (e.g., fingertip power 
switch vs. automatic height adjustment). To date, few research efforts in the field of 
advertising have identified emotional states in which each of these message strategies is 
likely to be effective.  
At its core, this dissertation, therefore, begins with the question: Do isolable 
emotions of the same global valence have differential impacts on consumers’ responses 
to advertising messages presenting product benefits and attributes at different levels? To 
investigate whether (and how) emotions exert different influences on the processing of 
advertising messages, this research manipulates emotional states rather than measuring 
chronic tendencies to experience them. In addition, these scenarios of advertising 
message framing illustrated above are associated with the two distinct mental 
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representations highlighted in construal level theory (Liberman and Trope, 1998; Trope 
and Liberman, 2010; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak, 2007). Construal level theory 
basically states that people’s mental representations of stimuli that are psychologically 
near to the self are often low-level and concrete while representation of stimuli that are 
psychologically distant from the self are often high-level and abstract (Liberman and 
Trope, 1998; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak, 2007). High-level construal is defined as 
leading to mental representations that are relatively more abstract, coherent, and 
superordinate compared with low-level construals (Trope and Liberman, 2010). 
Furthermore, individuals primed to have a low-construal mindset evaluate uncertain, 
psychologically remote events as less likely to occur whereas, those primed to have a 
high-construal mindset estimate these uncertain and remote events as more likely to 
happen (Todorov, Goren, and Trope, 2007; Trope and Liberman, 2010) 
The principles of construal level theory seem to be important to consider in the 
context of advertising and consumer choice because distinct mental representations at 
different levels provide insight into how certain advertising messages are effective (c.f., 
Dhar and Kim, 2007; Lee, Keller, and Sternthal, 2010). High-level construals are linked 
to the desirability of an event or object and are associated with why certain things are 
done, whereas low-level construals are concerned with the feasibility of the event or 
object and thus pertain to how certain things are done (Lee, Keller, and Sternthal, 2010; 
Trope and Liberman, 2010; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak, 2007).  
-6- 6
 
In this regard, advertising messages can be construed in terms of either why the 
advertised product is purchased or how it is helpful in pursuing imminent and proximal 
consumption goals (Lee, Keller, and Sternthal, 2010; Trope and Liberman, 2010). 
Viewed from this perspective, descriptions of elliptical trainers at a high-construal level 
ensure health benefits by using them. In contrast, how specific functional features work 
represent low-level construal. 
Further, high-level construal rather than low-level construal makes it possible to 
compare non-comparable features because making non-comparable features comparable 
needs to represent them in terms of more abstract attributes (Malkoc, Zauberman, and 
Bettman 2010; Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu, 2005; Trope and Liberman, 2010). 
Comparing a vacuum cleaner with a fingertip power switch and another with automatic 
height adjustment requires individuals to represent these features at a higher level in 
terms of convenience.  
Accordingly, this dissertation aims to accomplish three goals: 1) it establishes a 
theoretical framework that can explain the impacts of different emotions on mental 
construal levels 2) it also accounts for the effects on persuasion from matching emotional 
states and advertising messages that frame product benefits either at a more concrete or a 
more abstract construal level 3) it develops a mechanism explaining the effects of 
emotions on the cognitive shift toward relying more on nonalignable differences in a 
comparative advertising context. Toward this end, this dissertation specifically focuses on 
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the dimensions of certainty in classifying emotions beyond valence and investigating the 
effects of specific emotions on consumer evaluations of advertising messages construed 
at different levels for four reasons.  
First, the certainty dimension has been identified as an important one among the 
different cognitive appraisal dimensions developed by prior research (e.g., Roseman, 
1984, Frijda, 1987; Smith and Ellsworh, 1985). Second, various research studies indicate 
that certainty exerts a direct influence on cognitive processing and judgments (e.g., 
Festinger, 1954; Kelley, 1973; Pelham and Wachsmuth, 1995; Weary and Jacobson, 
1997). Third, recent research also found that emotions characterized as certainty (vs. 
uncertainty), regardless of their valence, influence an individual’s cognitive processing 
and judgment in a congruent manner (Tiedens and Linton, 2001). Fourth, according to 
recent construal level theory, one of the four factors determining levels of mental 
representations of events or objects is certainty (Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wakslak, et 
al. 2006). In particular, decreasing an event’s certainty allows individuals to represent the 
event in a more high-level and abstract manner with a focus on the general features of the 
event, while increasing an event’s certainty leads individuals to characterize the event in 
a more low-level and concrete way with an emphasis on the specific features of the event    
(Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wakslak, et al. 2006).  
This dissertation hypothesizes that, regardless of their valence, the certainty 
appraisal content of emotions exerts an influence on the individual’s construal level. In 
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particular, the current investigation predicts that individuals feeling uncertainty-related 
emotions represent events or behaviors at a higher level and evaluate uncertain events as 
more likely to occur than those individuals feeling certainty-related emotions. 
Specifically, Study 1 focuses the hypothesized relationship between certainty appraisals 
and construal levels and the effects of emotions on likelihood judgments about uncertain 
events using four emotional states (i.e., happiness, anger, hope, fear). Study 2 retests the 
predicted relationship and the effects of emotions on likelihood estimates with a more 
refined emotion-induction technique 
Further, based on the hypothesized relationship between emotions and construal 
levels, this dissertation research predicts that individuals induced with certainty-related 
emotions tend to be more persuaded by an ad message representing feasible attributes 
than an ad message emphasizing desirable benefits, while this effect is reversed for those 
induced with uncertainty-related emotions. Study 3 directly explores this prediction, 
inducing four emotional states and manipulating construal level in an ad message 
describing an elliptical trainer brand in terms of feasibility or desirability. Lastly, this 
study hypothesizes that uncertainty-related emotions lead individuals to evaluate a 
nonalignable-better brand and its ad message more favorably an alignable-better brand 
and its ad message in a comparative advertising context. Study 4 examines a cognitive 
shift toward relying more nonalignable differences in a comparative advertising context 
for vacuum cleaners.  
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This dissertation intends to contribute to advertising and consumer psychology 
literature on several fronts. First, this dissertation extends the theoretical framework of 
emotion and cognition via introducing construal levels. Second, it provides salient 
evidence showing that different emotions of the same valence can exert a distinctive 
effect on subsequent cognitive representations of stimuli and judgments. The findings add 
depth to our knowledge of the relationship between emotions and cognitive mechanisms. 
As a result, we might better understand the effect of emotional states on subsequent 
cognitive processing, judgment, and behavioral intention. Third, from a priming 
perspective, this dissertation shows how individuals’ emotional states have an influence 
on the interpretations of advertising messages. In addition, the findings point to how 
advertisers should develop their advertising strategies in terms of the relationship 
between consumers’ emotional states and address practical implications for marketers 
and advertisers.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a 
broad theoretical background on emotions, their effect on cognitive processing and 
mental construal level. Chapter 3 offers review of related research that directs to the 
hypotheses and research question of this dissertation study. Chapter 4 involves the four 
experimental studies described above. Chapter 5 provides the overall discussion for this 
set of studies, theoretical contributions, managerial implications, and limitations and 
recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter will discuss, first, the definitions of affect, emotion, and mood. 
Because those important terms have been used interchangeably in the literature, this 
section clearly defines each term and distinguishes them from one another. The second 
section of this literature will review the research findings of previous research efforts on 
affective effects. Given that this dissertation emphasizes the importance of diverse 
emotions beyond mere valence, the third section will review research studies with regard 
to cognitive-appraisal dimensions distinguishing emotions from one another. Further, 
research on the certainty dimension and certainty-congruent effect will be discussed. The 
final section of this literature review discusses about construal level theory and reviews 
how perceived certainty exerts an influence on levels of mental representation.   
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
There is little universal agreement about how best to define the terms affect, 
emotions, and mood (Fiedler, 1988; Frijda, 1986). Some scholars have used these terms 
interchangeably, yet a closer looks reveals the terms to be distinct concepts, each with 
distinctive effects on consumer behavior (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer, 1999; 
Forgas,1995). This dissertation focuses on emotions, which are categorized by cognitive 
appraisals and exert a significant influence on subsequent cognitive processing, judgment, 
and behavior; however, this section seeks to distinguish emotion from affect and mood 
for the sake of conceptual clarity.  
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The term “affect” is, in essence, defined as an umbrella term describing internal 
feeling states that include moods, emotions, and related mental states (Bagozzi, Gopinath, 
and Nyer, 1999; Cohen and Areni, 1991). Russell and Carroll (1999) define affect as 
“genuine subjective feelings and moods” (p. 3). They also indicate that “affect” is 
distinguished from an evaluative judgment toward objects and events. In this regard, the 
term affect refers to the internal feeling state. An evaluative judgment – an individual’s 
explicit or implicit liking for some object, person, or position – is distinct from, but likely 
influenced by, that internal feeling state. Therefore, this dissertation regards affect as a 
general category for mental feeling processes (the internal feeling state) rather than a 
particular psychological process.  
Moods are a subcategory of affect and are conceptualized most often as “low 
intensity and diffuse affective states that generally lack source identification” (Cohen, 
Pham, and Andrade, 2008, p. 299). Individuals prompted by internal body activities or 
external stimuli experience a vague sense of feeling good or bad without necessarily 
knowing quite why (Cohen, Pham, and Andrade, 2008). That is, when an individual is in 
a specific mood state, he or she is less likely to recognize the actual source of the state. It 
is also important to note that the same individual can experience different mood states 
depending on different contexts and these mood states are considered state-bound 
(Gardner, 1985). In this regard, mood states tend to guide self-regulatory responses in a 
less intentional way (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer, 1999).  
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The term “emotion” is viewed as a feeling state of readiness that results from 
cognitive appraisals of events or thoughts (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991). Compared to 
moods, emotions are much more differentiated and hence provide more attitude- and 
behavior-specific information (Cohen, Pham, and Andrade, 2008). Therefore, emotion is 
more likely than mood to be directly coupled with action tendencies and explicit actions 
(Frijda, 1993). The appraisal process that leads to emotion is based on antecedent 
motivational variables that interact with a set of environmental demands, constraints, and 
resources (Lazarus, 1991).  
Emotions act as a link between events in the environment and individuals’ 
responses (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer, 1999). The emotions individuals experience in 
their lives strongly influence how they act in response to events and situations 
(Frederickson and Branigan 2005; Frijda, 2005; Siemer, Mauss, and Gross, 2007). 
Emotions promote learning that will help people make appropriate responses in the future 
(Siemer, Mauss, and Gross, 2007). Accordingly, emotions play an important role in 
generating distinct behavioral patterns relevant to a particular kind of significant events 
or situations. 
In recent decades, different approaches have been developed to account for the 
effects of affect states on cognitive processing, judgment, and behavior. The next section 
reviews different explanations about the effects of affect states. Although this dissertation 
will apply the term emotion in its research questions, the literature review below builds 
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on the existing scholarship, which uses emotion and mood interchangeably and does not 
put forth a universal consensus about the distinction between the two terms. The 
emphasis below, therefore, is on the integrative term affect.    
AFFECTIVE STATES AND EFFECTS 
In recent decades, an extensive body of research has explored the effects of 
affective states from different approaches. The majority of research on affective effects 
has presumed the influential importance of affect states at the time of processing (Cohen, 
Pham, and Andrade, 2008). This body of research has typically induced positive affective 
states as happy and negative affective states as sad and looked at how those states related 
to processing (Hullett, 2005). The focus tends to be on contrasting the differential effects 
of positive and negative states (Hullett, 2005). Despite the limitations of the valence-
based approach, which are detailed further below, these research findings do provide a 
baseline understanding about how affect states are linked to cognitive processing, as well 
as judgment and behavior. 
At an aggregate level, it is possible to divide the explanations of affective effects 
into three groups: capacity, information, and motivation. Capacity and informational 
explanations presume that an individual’s affect state at a single point in time has an 
influence on processing, judgment, and eventually behavior. Motivational explanations 
assume that an individual’s projected discrepancy between affect states at two points in 
time results in the motivational property of affect and, therefore, plays the major role in 
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guiding cognitive or behavioral activities (c.f., affect management theory, Zillmann, 1988; 
affect maintenance hypothesis, Clark and Isen, 1982).   
Affect’s Impact on Capacity, Accessibility  
The basic explanation for the capacity approach is the differential accessibility of 
distinctive materials in associative working memory under positive versus negative 
affective states (Isen, 2008). From this perspective, positive affect produces a situation in 
which a considerable amount of materials are activated in working memory (Isen, 1984; 
Mackie and Worth, 1989). Capacity theorists have suggested that the presence of 
activated and preactivated materials in working memory provides both a complex and 
distracting cognitive context in terms of which incoming information must be interpreted 
(e.g., Mackie and Worth, 1991). Therefore, it has been suggested that compared to 
negative affect, positive affect is associated with more conceptual nodes in working 
memory and creates a state of greater cognitive busyness (e.g., Isen, 2008; Mackie and 
Worth, 1991).  
Within the capacity framework, the simultaneous accessibility of cognitive 
materials in working memory tends to broaden or make diffuse the focus of attention, 
leading to a continual allocation and reallocation of processing capacity (Isen, 2008). 
According to Mackie and Worth (1991), individuals in positive affect tend to reduce the 
cognitive capacity available for information processing and are unable to maintain the 
cognitive and attentional focus that is demanded by extensive and elaborate processing 
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(Isen, 1984, 2008; Mackie and Worth 1991). From the viewpoint of capacity theorists, it 
is difficult for individuals in positive affect to focus attention on tasks that require 
sequential or analytic processing.  
In addition, capacity theorists explain that positive affect decreases systematic 
processing for motivational reasons related to the subjective experience of being in a 
positive affective state (Mackie and Worth, 1991). Some empirical investigations using 
this approach show that the use of heuristic processing strategies provide an effective 
means for people in positive affective states (i.e. happy) to avoid complex processing and 
maintain their positive affect because extensive thinking about complex problems can be 
both effortful and stressful (Isen, 2008). Therefore, capacity theorists suggest that 
individuals are motivated to maintain this positive state, selectively engaging in cognitive 
processing activities that threaten to destroy it (Isen, 2008; Isen and Levin, 1972; Isen and 
Simmons, 1978). From this perspective, the use of judgment heuristics by people in a 
positive affect reflects a lack of desire to process extensively (Mackie and Worth, 1991).  
Within the capacity framework, affective states exert an influence on subsequent 
cognitive processing and judgment in a valence-congruent manner. That is, positive 
affect is expected to lead to a more favorable evaluation of the environment, while 
negative affect is expected to lead to a less favorable evaluation of the environment 
(Bower, 1981; Isen, 2008). In a pioneering study, Axelrod (1963) observed that, after 
viewing a depressing television documentary, consumers evaluated a variety of products 
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more negatively than they did before they saw the documentary. These shifts in 
evaluation were found to be directly related to changes in participants’ affective states. 
Through two experimental studies, Isen and her colleagues (1978) found that compared 
to control subjects, subjects who were put in a positive state through a small gift and false 
success feedback were more willing to participate in a survey and evaluated products 
more favorably, respectively.  
In the advertising context, research studies have shown that emotional states 
elicited by TV shows, magazines, and music generally has a congruent influence on 
consumers’ evaluations of the ad but less influence on their evaluations of the advertised 
brand (e.g., Gardner and Wilhelm, 1987; Goldberg and Gorn, 1987; Mathur and 
Chattopadhyay, 1991; Murry and Dacin, 1996; Yi, 1990). For instance, Gorn (1982) 
found that people who had seen a pen advertised while pleasant music from the movie 
“Grease” was playing in the background were more likely to choose this pen than people 
who had seen the same pen advertised while classical Indian music which served as 
unpleasant music was playing in the background. Furthermore, Raghunathan and Irwin 
(2001) found that even the mere action of browsing a series of attractive options may 
elevate a consumer’s affect and result in congruent effects on subsequent evaluations. 
Capacity explanations focus on contrasting the influential effects of a positive 
affective state and a negative affective state and highlight the congruency between 
affective states and their subsequent effects. The congruent effects may be applied to 
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investigating the different effects of specific affective states of the same valence (e.g., 
fear and anger).     
Affect as Information 
The basic assumption of informational explanations is that affect states may 
inform the individual about the nature of the current situation (Frijda, 1988; Schwarz and 
Clore, 1983). Linking these states from cognition to judgment, informational 
explanations posit that people use their emotional states as signals about the current 
situation or about the quality of their judgment. From this perspective, individuals usually 
feel good in situations that are characterized by positive outcomes and/or in situations 
that do not threaten their current goals. In contrast, individuals usually feel bad in 
situations that threaten their current goals, because of the presence of negative outcomes 
or the lack of positive outcomes (Schwarz and Clore, 1996).  
Within the informational explanations, the ‘affect-as-information’ approach 
argues that the experience of negative affect indicates to the individual a threat to the 
achievement of desired goals; in those experiences, the situation calls for systematic and 
attentive processing (Bless, 2000; Bless et al., 1996; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz and Clore, 
1983). This approach also suggests that positive affect signals that the situation is safe 
and general, easily accessible knowledge constructs are a sufficient basis for judgment 
(Bless, 2000; Bless et al., 1996; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz and Clore, 1983). On the other 
hand, the ‘affect-as-input’ approach contends that positive affect signals that one has 
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sufficient information to make a judgment. Thus, when an individual's goal is making an 
accurate judgment, the person will look to his or her affect as an indicator of whether he 
or she knows enough (Hirt et al., 1996; Martin et al., 1997; Martin et al., 1993).  
Within the informational explanations, there are two opposing arguments about 
the stage in which affect exerts an influence on evaluation stages. For example, Schwarz 
and Clore (1988, 1996) contend that affective states are assumed to enter into judgments 
during the formal evaluation stages. In contrast, recent findings suggest that the 
informative influence of affect states may take place earlier in the process, during an 
initial evaluation of the object or the situation (Yeung and Wyer, 2004). These findings 
indicate that affect is able to influence ways of cognitive processing as a determinant.  
Of importance in informational explanations is the relationship between affect and 
perceptions of one’s current situation, and the differential impact of positive and negative 
affect on those perceptions. However, recent research has extended the research focus to 
different affective states within the same valence (e.g. two distinct positive states), and 
how those states differentially influence people’s perceptions of current situations, 
particularly in terms of certainty and attention (Roseman, 1984, Smith and Ellsworth, 
1985, Tiedens and Linton, 2001). This dissertation seeks to build on this nascent research, 
as will be described in later sections and in Chapter 3.  
Affect as Motivation 
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Motivational explanations (e.g., Clark and Isen, 1982; Zillmann, 1988) presume 
that people intuitively strive to arrive in a positive affect state when feeling bad, and then 
protect it once the desired state has been achieved (Bower, 1981; Fiedler et al., 2003; 
Forgas and Bower, 1987; Wegener and Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty, and Smith, 1995). 
Compared to capacity and informational explanations, motivational explanations argue 
that individuals separately assess their current affective state and forecast the affective 
consequences which are likely to be produced by the subsequent behaviors and 
judgments (Bower, 1981; Fiedler et al., 2003; Forgas and Bower, 1987; Pham, 2004). 
According to the motivational explanations, individuals use the affective 
discrepancy between the two affective states (current and forecast) as a judgment 
criterion and decide their behavioral or cognitive strategies in order to maintain and 
arrive at a positive affective state (Erber and Erber, 2000; Erber, Wegner, and Therriault, 
1996; Pham, 2004). In particular, individuals in a positive affective state tend to respond 
to external situations and stimuli through their internal mental structures. This is because 
positive affect provides individuals with the resources and self-confidence that allow 
them to engage in spontaneous cognition and focus internally in the process of 
determining behavior (Fiedler, 1995, 2001; Ruder and Bless, 2003). In contrast, when 
individuals are in a negative state, they are more likely to interact with external situations 
and stimuli (Fiedler, 2001). That is, individuals in a negative affective state turn some 
attention outward and begin modifying their internal mental structures and develop 
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cognitive and behavioral strategies in order to cope with or respond to externally 
determined rules and social conventions. Accordingly, researchers contend that the two 
different affective states work distinctively as drivers of cognitive and behavioral 
strategies (Ruder and Bless, 2003).  
Furthermore, an individual’s affective regulation strategy can vary according to 
task characteristics and levels of cognitive resource availability. For instance, Martin et al. 
(1993) found that participants in a negative state worked longer than those in a positive 
state when the task instruction was to keep working until satisfied with the performance. 
However, when instructed to keep working until they no longer enjoyed the task, the 
effect reversed: respondents in a negative state stopped sooner than those in a positive 
state (Martin et al., 1993). These results illustrate that the same affective state can have 
very different interpretations depending on the question that people are asking themselves 
(Martin et al., 1993). The effects of affective states also can be enhanced under 
conditions of reduced processing capacity (Siemer and Reisenzein, 1998). As cognitive 
resources become depleted, individuals intentionally control their cognitive resources and 
processing capacities (Siemer and Reisenzein, 1998).   
In summary, the motivational explanations mostly focus on how people use 
different coping strategies according to positive versus negative states in order to 
maintain their positive affective state and avoid negative affective states. In this respect, 
the motivational explanations provide insights into how individuals’ current affective 
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states exert an influence on their perceptions of current situations, and on how they 
develop coping strategies on the basis of expected affective states and situations.  
LIMITATIONS OF VALENCE-BASED APPROACHES  
Based on the three explanations outlined above, empirical research on the effects 
of affective states has focused heavily on exploring the differential impacts of positive 
versus negative affect on the degree and depth of cognitive processing (Hullett, 2005). 
These empirical efforts primarily is based on the assumption that all negative and all 
positive emotions would lead to similar effects on judgment and decision-making. 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that positive affect is significantly associated with 
heuristic processing strategies, whereas negative affect drives individuals to use 
systematic and elaborative processing strategies (Batra and Stayman, 1990; Bless et al., 
1990; Bohner, Moskowitz, and Chaiken, 1995; Mackie, Asuncion, and Rosselli, 1992; 
Mackie and Worth, 1989, 1991; Murray et al., 1990; Schwarz, Bless, and Bohner, 1991; 
Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair and Mark, 1992; Worth and Mackie, 1987).  
It is argued that, because individuals in a positive affective state (i.e., happy) tend 
to employ heuristic or peripheral processing, these individuals rely on global knowledge 
structures and internal cues when evaluating messages and arriving at judgments (Bless et 
al., 1996; Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Suesser, 1994). On the other hand, individuals in a 
negative affective state (i.e., sad) use a more systematic, data-driven, and analytical form 
of processing when they evaluate persuasive messages and make judgments about the 
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argument in the messages (Hullet 2005). Thus, it has been widely accepted that positive 
affect generally decreases the depth with which individuals process substantive 
information in persuasion and attitude formation, whereas negative affect increases the 
care with which individuals process substantive information in persuasion (Batra and 
Stayman, 1990; Bless et al., 1990; Bless, Mackie, and Schwarz, 1992; Mackie and Worth, 
1989; Worth and Mackie, 1987).  
As described earlier, the majority of research on affective effects has focused on 
contrasting the differential impacts between positive and negative affect. However, it is 
not conceptually accurate to consider emotions as containing only affective valence 
information ranging from negative to positive feelings. Further, these valence-based 
approaches fail to rigorously explain the nature of emotional responses in many different 
contexts (Bagozzi, Gophinath, and Nyer, 1999). An increasing number of research 
findings have noted that an array of distinct affective states within the same valence can 
be differentiated. Research suggests that negative emotion includes an array of distinct 
states ranging from sad, angry, fearful, disgusted and beyond (Frijda, 1993; Smith and 
Ellsworth, 1985), which implies qualitative differences in the experience beyond mere 
affective valence.  
Indeed, a recent stream of research on affective effects shows that different 
affective states of the same valence (e.g., fear, anger, sadness) exert a different influence 
on subsequent cognitive processing, judgment, and behavior (e.g., Lerner and Keltner, 
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2000, 2001; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein, 2004; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; 
Raghunathan, Pham, and Corfman, 2006; Tiedens and Linton, 2001). The central idea 
behind this stream of research is that there are qualitative differences in affective states 
(Tiedens and Linton, 2001). This stream of research has identified cognitive-appraisal 
dimensions as key to understanding these qualitative differences (Green and Sedikides, 
1999; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Tiedens and Linton, 
2001). In the following section, the definition of cognitive appraisal and related appraisal 
dimensions are discussed.  
DEFINITION OF COGNITIVE-APPRAISALS 
Cognitive appraisal theories arose from acknowledging the lack of an overarching 
theory capable of thoroughly differentiating a wide array of emotions beyond valence and 
explaining their different effects (e.g., Roseman 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). These 
appraisal approaches intend to construct the mechanism explaining why certain situations 
and experiences lead to specific emotional responses. Appraisal theorists posit that 
emotions result from cognitive activities such as processing, or evaluating personally 
relevant information (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 1984; Smith 
and Ellsworth 1985). Evaluations and interpretations of events, rather than events per se, 
determine whether a specific emotion will be felt (Frijda 1986; Roseman 1984; Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985; Smith and Lazarus 1993).  
Appraisal is, thus, defined “as an evaluation of what one’s relationship to the 
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environment implies for personal well-being” (Smith and Lazarus, 1993, p. 234) and 
specific emotions vary in terms of cognitive appraisals (Roseman, Spindel, and Jose, 
1990; Smith and Lazarus, 1993). From a cognitive appraisal perspective, different 
emotional states can be distinguished on the basis of which appraisal components are 
involved and how they are involved (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1993; Smith and 
Ellsworth, 1985; Ellsworth and Smith, 1988). That is, the different combinations of these 
cognitive appraisals elicit different emotions.  
For instance, guilt, anxiety, and sadness are all negative emotions, but they differ 
in terms of other appraisal components; guilt involves self-accountability, anxiety 
involves uncertain emotion-focused coping potential, and sadness involves low future 
expectancy for change (Smith and Lazarus, 1993). Because the focus of this dissertation 
is the effects of specific emotional states beyond mere valence on mental representations 
of events or objects and related judgment, it is quite important to examine previous 
research on the cognitive appraisal dimensions associated with identifying and defining 
specific emotional states beyond the valence dimension.    
COGNITIVE-APPRAISAL DIMENSIONS & EMOTIONS 
Through empirical examination of all appraisal dimensions in the prior research, 
Roseman (1984) proposed that five appraisals influence the experience of emotions. 
These include motivational state, situational state, probability (certainty), power, and 
agency (Roseman, 1984). The appraisal of motivational state is defined by whether the 
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dominant operative motive of an individual in a given situation is represented as 
appetitive (a reward that he or she seeks to attain) or aversive (a punishment that he or 
she seeks to avoid) (Roseman, 1984). Situational state is defined as a dimension assessing 
whether events are inconsistent or consistent with a person's motives (Roseman, 1984). 
Probability is assessed on the basis of whether a given outcome is judged to be certain or 
uncertain (Roseman, 1984). Power (legitimacy) is defined as whether a person believes a 
positive outcome is deserved or a negative outcome is deserved in the situation (Roseman, 
1984). Agency is an appraisal dimension related to evaluating whether an outcome is 
caused by impersonal circumstances and some other persons, or the self (Roseman, 1984).  
According to Roseman, Spindel, and Jose (1990), the experience of weakness 
leads to feeling sadness, distress, or fear, rather than frustration; dislike toward someone 
(unfriendliness) rather than anger; and guilt rather than regret. In addition, Roseman, 
Spindel, and Jose (1990) suggest that sadness (sorrow) results from an absence of reward 
that is certain and caused by impersonal circumstances when a negative outcome is 
deserved. In contrast, anger is caused by the absence of a reward or presence of a 
punishment that is caused by other people when a positive outcome is deserved 
(Roseman, Spindel, and Jose, 1990). Experiencing surprise results from events appraised 
as so uncertain as to be unknown or unexpected (Roseman, Spindel, and Jose, 1990).  
Disgust, like distress, is predicted to result from events appraised as inconsistent with an 
aversive motive, certain, and caused by circumstances. Shame, like guilt, results from 
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events appraised as motive inconsistent and caused by the self (Roseman, Spindel, and 
Jose, 1990). 
Smith and Ellsworth (1985, 1987) and Ellsworth and Smith (1988) developed an 
appraisal model by integrating the models of Roseman (1984) and Scherer (1982). They 
showed that emotions are categorized along the five cognitive appraisal dimensions. They 
consistently found evidence for five appraisal dimensions: (a) pleasantness: whether an 
experience is unpleasant or pleasant, (b) certainty: whether a situation involves 
uncertainty or certainty about what is happening, (c) self/other-agency: whether events 
are controlled by the self or another person, (d) attentional activity: whether a person is 
trying to devote attention to a stimulus or divert attention from it, and (e) anticipated 
effort: the amount of effort seen as needed to deal with a situation. Various additional 
appraisals—including perceived obstacle, legitimacy, and situational control (agency)—
sometimes do and sometimes do not differentiate among emotions. For instance, when 
people feel angry or remember feeling anger, they report thinking that the situation is 
unpleasant and not of their own doing and that they are moderately certain about what is 
happening (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985, Ellsworth and Smith, 1988a). 
Based on the cognitive appraisals described above, Ellsworth and Smith (1988) 
explored how cognitive appraisals differentiated and characterized specific emotions 
beyond mere valence. According to Ellsworth and Smith (1988), shame and guilt are 
distinguished by appraisals of self-agency while anger, contempt, and disgust by 
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appraisals of other-agency. The central dimensions that differentiate fear from other 
negative emotions are uncertainty and anticipated effort. Sadness arises from appraisals 
of other-responsibility for negative events and individual control (Ellsworth and Smith, 
1988). On the other hand, certainty and effort are the central dimensions which 
distinguish happiness from other positive emotions while hope arises from appraisals of a 
sense of low uncertainty and individual control (Ellsworth and Smith, 1988) 
Frijda and colleagues (Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1989) 
conducted two empirical research studies to investigate cognitive appraisals proposed by 
a number of theorists. Through these two investigations, they found relatively strong 
support for appraisals of (a) valence: whether an event is unpleasant or pleasant, (b) 
certainty: whether the outcome of an event is uncertain or certain, (c) agency: whether the 
self or someone else is responsible for the occurrence of an event, (d) interestingness: 
whether an event is neutral or interesting, and (e) globality: whether an event can be 
localized in space. An additional appraisal of impact or importance distinguishes 
emotions (higher impact) from moods.  
More important, it is worth noting that recent research efforts have found that 
different emotional states in the same affective valence exert different influences on 
cognitive processing, judgment, and behavior (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner, 
Small, and Loewenstein, 2004; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Raghunathan, Pham, and 
Corfman, 2006; Tiedens and Linton, 2001). In the following, some of these research 
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findings are reviewed and discussed. 
DIFFERENT EMOTIONS AND DIFFERENT EFFECTS 
With a focus on the relationship between perceived risk and reward, Raghunathan 
and Pham (1999) found that, in choices between high-risk/high-reward and low-risk/low-
reward options, sad individuals consistently favor the former, whereas anxious 
individuals consistently favor the latter. This is presumably because, even though their 
states are temporarily dominant, sad individuals tend to infer that they have lost 
something of value, which activates a goal of reward acquisition that shift s preferences 
toward high-reward options. In contrast, anxious individuals tend to infer that the 
situation is uncertain and beyond control (typical causes of anxiety), which activates a 
goal of risk avoidance that shifts preferences toward low-risk options.  
Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) found that sadness reverses the classic 
endowment effect, that is, the tendency to place a higher value on objects that are already 
in individuals’ possession compared to identical objects that not in their possession. In 
contrast, disgust eliminates the endowment effect. According to Lerner, Small, and 
Loewenstein (2004), this is because sadness creates an individual’s motivation to change 
the current situation, which increases the willingness to pay for objects that are not in his 
possession (higher purchase prices) and also increases the willingness to sell objects that 
currently are (lower selling prices). In contrast, disgust triggers an impulse to get rid of 
objects that are currently in his possession (lower selling prices) without necessarily 
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distorting the value of objects that are not in his possession (unchanged purchase prices).  
More importantly, existing evidences suggest that emotional states categorized by 
cognitive appraisal dimensions produce judgments that are congruent with their 
constituent appraisals. For instance, Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) found that 
participants in an angry state tended to blame someone one else for a subsequent negative 
event, whereas participants in a sad state were more likely to blame the situation, the 
agency associated with sadness. Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) also found that feeling 
of fear associated with appraisal that situation is risky enhanced perceptions of risk in a 
subsequent situation.  
DeSteno et al. (2000) found that congruency along appraisal dimensions existed 
between emotional states and subsequent judgments in an emotion-specific manner. For 
instance, participants in a sad state believed sad events to be more likely to occur than 
angering ones. In contrast, angry participants estimated that angering events were more 
likely to occur than sad ones. DeSteno et al. (2000) suggest that the congruency between 
emotional states and their effects on cognition results from the informational value of 
specific emotions rather than their valence.  
These research results explicitly indicate that appraisal-congruent cognition and 
judgment exist along any appraisal dimension. Further, some research focused on the 
certainty appraisal of emotional states and found the congruency between emotional 
states associated with feeling certain (vs. uncertain) and subsequent cognitive processing 
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as well as judgment (Tiedens and Linton 2001). The research findings about certainty 
appraisal and its effect on information processing are discussed in the following section.  
CERTAINTY & CONGRUENT EFFECTS  
As explained, an increasing number of research findings indicate that specific 
central appraisal dimensions differentiate some emotions from other emotions. Among 
other dimensions, certainty has been deemed quite important in differentiating specific 
emotions In particular, a sense of uncertainty differentiates fear from other negative 
emotions while feeling of happiness is more strongly associated with the sense of 
certainty compared to other positive emotions (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1993).  
From the affect-as-information approach, the experience of certainty-related 
emotions signals a higher certainty and confidence about what is occurring in the current 
situation and what will happen next (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). In contrast, other 
emotions associated with the sense of uncertainty lead individuals to feel unsure what is 
happening in the current situation and to about what will happen next (Fridja 1993; 
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Therefore, certainty 
appraisal is the degree to which future events seem predictable and comprehensible 
versus unpredictable and incomprehensible to the individual. Previous research suggests 
that the experience of certainty resulting from emotions can give rise to appraisal-
congruent judgments in a subsequent situations and that the resulting experience of 




Weary and Jacobson (1997) found that individuals who chronically feel 
uncertainty are more likely to process information more systematically than do those who 
chronically feel certain. Relatedly, depressed individuals tend to process information in a 
more systematic way because they lack confidence in their own judgments (Edwards and 
Weary, 1993). Tiedens and Linton (2001) also found that respondents made predictions 
with greater confidence when under states of disgust or happiness than when under states 
of fear or hopefulness. They suggest that this is presumably because both disgust and 
happiness typically arise in situations appraised as certain (e.g., witnessing something 
repulsive or receiving very good news), whereas fear and hope typically arise in 
situations appraised as uncertain (e.g., going up for tenure). Further, Tiedens and Linton 
(2001) showed that individuals in emotional states associated with feeling certain used 
heuristic processing strategies, whereas those in emotional states related to feeling 
uncertain employed systematic processing strategies.  
Taken together, the appraisal dimension of certainty has been recognized as an 
important one influencing people’s cognitive processing and judgment in a congruent 
manner. Nevertheless, our knowledge about the relationship between the certainty 
dimension and levels of mental representations is limited. In the next section, construal 




CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY  
Construal level theory is an explanation of how psychological distance influences 
individuals’ thoughts and behavior. On the basis of theories of categorization (Rosch 
1975), concept formation (Medin and Smith 1984), and action identification (Vallacher 
and Wegner 1987), construal level theory basically proposes that individuals use low-
level construals to represent psychologically near events or objects, whereas they use 
high-level construals to represent psychologically distant events or actions (Trope and 
Liberman 2010). Construal level theory defines high-level construals (e.g., a 
“communication device”) as abstract, coherent, superordinate, and decontextualized 
mental representations that extract the gist from the available information about events or 
actions (Trope and Liberman 2010). Low-level construals (e.g., a “cell phone”) are, in 
contrast, defined as concrete, specific, subordinate, and contextualized representations of 
information about events or actions (Trope and Liberman 2010). Construal of 
psychologically remote events or objects emphasizes their superordinate or central 
features, whereas construal of psychologically proximate events emphasizes their 
subordinate or secondary features.  
According to construal level theory, how people construe events or objects 
depends on their psychological distance from the events or objects. For example, a high-
level construal may represent “painting a room” as “making the room look fresh,” 
whereas a low level construal may represent the same event as “applying brush strokes.” 
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Similarly, a high-level construal may represent “moving into a new apartment” as 
“starting a new life,” while a low-level construal may represent the same event as 
“packing and carrying boxes.” Thus, construal level theory suggests that the same 
information about an event or action is more likely to be construed in terms of 
superordinate features rather than subordinate features when the event or object is 
psychologically distant than near (Trope and Liberman 2010). To use a visual analogy, at 
a greater distance from an event or action, the main features of the event or action are 
more prominent, whereas the details are less prominent. From a distant perspective, 
individuals using high-level construals tend to see the forest, but from a proximal 
perspective, they are more likely to see the trees, using low-level construals (Fiedler 
2007). 
At the core of differentiating construal levels lie psychological distances. A 
research stream within the framework of construal level theory has shown that different 
dimensions of psychological distance affect mental representations and that these mental 
representations, in turn, guide prediction, evaluation, and behavior. The dimensions of 
psychological distances influencing people’s construal levels include a temporal, spatial, 
social, and certainty-related (probability) distance (Fiedler, 2007; Trope and Liberman 
2010; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). Representations of psychologically distant 
events or actions achieve abstraction by omitting secondary and incidental features about 
them, whereas representations of psychological near events or actions are rich in details 
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(Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak, 2007). That is, moving from a concrete representation of 
events or objects to a more abstract representation involves retaining central features and 
omitting features that by the very act of abstraction are deemed incidental (Trope and 
Liberman, 2010).  
Desirability vs. Feasibility 
Another significant difference between high-level and low-level mental construals 
of events or actions is their emphasis on desirability versus feasibility considerations 
(Liberman and Trope, 1998). Desirability refers to the value of an end-state of the events 
or actions, whereas feasibility refers to the ease or difficulty of reaching the end-state 
(Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman, 2002). That is, desirability focuses on the 
superordinate “why” aspects of events or actions, whereas feasibility refers to subordinate 
“how” aspects of them (Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak, 2007). For example, students 
using a high-level construal are more likely to represent an academic course with a focus 
on the interest level of the course, whereas students using a low-level construal of the 
course will represent information about the difficulty of the course (Sagristano, Trope, 
Liberman, 2002). Accordingly, desirability is associated with a high-level feature of an 
event or action and is likely to be more influential in decisions about the more 
psychologically distant event or action. Feasibility, in contrast, is a low-level feature of 
an event or action and therefore is expected to be more influential in making decisions 
about the more psychologically near event or object. Based on the psychological distance 
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of events or objects, people tend to focus on either goals associated with desirability or 
goals related to feasibility. That is, when they experience more psychological distance 
from an event or objects, they prefer desirability to feasibility (Trope and Liberman, 
2010).  
Alignable vs. Nonalignable Differences 
In addition to representing consumption goals in different ways, mental construal 
levels play a pivotal role in evaluating product alternatives based on their attributes and 
choosing one of them in preference formation (Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu, 2005). 
From a structural alignment approach (Gentner and Markman, 1994; Markman and 
Medin, 1995, Medin, Goldstone, and Markman, 1995), individuals evaluate product 
alternatives based on three attribute types. These types are commonalities, alignable 
differences, and nonalignable differences (Gentner and Markman, 1994). Commonalities 
are defined as identical attribute levels across alternatives (Gentner and Markman, 1994). 
Alignable differences are "features that are comparable along the same dimension" 
(Zhang and Markman 1998, p. 413), whereas nonalignable differences refer to attributes 
that are uniquely associated with one brand but not the other (Zhang and Markman, 2001). 
For instance, when comparing two laptop computers, the argument that one has 2 
GB RAM, the other has only 1 GB RAM emphasizes an alignable difference. On the 
other hand, the claim that one laptop computer has a DVD-ROM player while the other 
computer has a pre-installed antivirus program points to a nonalignable difference. When 
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choosing among alternatives in the product evaluation context, individuals primarily rely 
more on alignable differences than nonalignable differences because nonalignable 
differences are more difficult to process (Gentner and Markman, 1994). However, 
according to recent research, this pattern of relying more on alignable differences 
sometimes might not occur.  
Based on temporal distance, Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu (2005) manipulated 
participants to have a high-level or low-level construal mindset. They then asked 
participants to evaluate two brands of potato chips. The two brands were designed to be 
equally attractive overall; one of the options, however, was designed to be better on its 
alignable attributes, whereas the other brand was better on its nonalignable attributes. The 
results showed that when participants with a high-level construal mindset, they increased 
their reliance more on nonalignable attributes in spite of the difficulty of comparing 
nonalignable products attributes. Participants primed to have a high-level construal 
mindset chose the nonalignable better option over the alignable better option (Malkoc, 
Zauberman, and Ulu, 2005). This result clearly indicates that comparing nonalignable 
attributes requires higher-level construal than comparing alignable attributes because 
making nonalignable attributes comparable requires representing them at a higher 
construal level.  
Certainty and Construal Levels 
How does an individual’s perception of certainty relate to the types of construal 
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levels discussed earlier? As discussed, one of the four dimensions of psychological 
distance is certainty (probability) (Bar-Anan, Liberman, and Trope, 2006; Todorov, 
Goren, and Trope, 2007; Trope and Liberman, 2010). Wakslak, et al. (2006) conducted a 
series of experimental studies to explore the relationship between certainty-related 
distances and construal levels. In one of the studies, participants were asked to imagine 
that they were either highly likely or highly unlikely to engage in the scenario and to 
group objects related to each of four scenarios into as many groups as they deemed 
appropriate. Participants in the improbable condition created fewer, broader groups out of 
the objects than participants in the low-likelihood condition (Wakslak et al., 2006).  
In another study, Wakslak, et al. (2006) asked participants to read a flyer 
advertising a paid research assistant position described in broad, general terms (e.g., 
helping behavior research) as well as in specific, low-level terms (e.g., dropping a book 
in front of participants). Participants in the high-probability condition were told that they 
would be almost certain to get the position if they signed up for the post, while 
participants in the low-probability condition were told that they would be unlikely to get 
the position if they signed up for the post. At that study's end, participants were asked to 
indicate the nature of the research assistantship that had been advertised earlier. 
Participants in the high-probability condition were more likely to provide specific than 
general descriptions of the assistantship; this tendency was significantly lower for 
participants in the low-probability condition. In addition to these open-ended responses, 
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participants were asked to identify the assistantship in specific or general terms on a 
forced-choice item. While participants in the high-probability condition preferred the 
specific to the general identification, those in the low-probability condition preferred the 
general identification to the specific one.  
Accordingly, Wakslak et al. (2006) suggest that decreasing the probability of a 
given event enhances the tendency to activate high-level construals of that event. That is, 
certainty (probability) influences a set of distinct but related variables (e.g., identification 
of ends vs. means, broad vs. specific categorization, global vs. local processing) that are 
implicated in a general shift between high-level construals and low-level construals 
(Wakslak et al., 2006). These results provide invaluable insights into how an individual’s 
perception of certainty has an influential impact on his or her subsequent representations 
of events or actions.  
Following this logic, it is possible that people in an emotional state associated 
with feeling certain are more likely to represent events or actions in a more low-level, 
concrete manner in terms of their concrete and detailed features, where those in an 
emotional state related to feeling uncertain tend to represent the events or actions in a 




Chapter 3: Research Question and Hypotheses 
A considerable amount of research studies have investigated the effects of 
emotional states on cognitive processing, judgment, and behavior from different 
perspectives and contributed to enhancing our knowledge about the persuasive effects of 
emotions. Nonetheless, existing research findings have barely identified the link between 
emotional states and advertising messages framed at different construal levels. In other 
words, few empirical studies have investigated the persuasive impacts of emotions on 
advertising messages describing product benefits or attributes either in a more high-level 
or in a more low-level manner. One exception is Labroo and Patrick (2009), who 
explored the effects of affective states on levels of mental construal and persuasion 
within the valence-based framework. Even though Labroo and Patrick’s (2009) effort is 
meaningful in terms of linking emotions to construal levels, their research findings 
appear to be limited because of their valence-based approach. 
Based on the information explanations, Labroo and Patrick (2009) suggest that by 
signaling that a situation is benign, happiness allows individuals to broaden their 
attention and to focus on future opportunities, whereas by signaling that the situation is 
problematic and imminent, unhappiness leads them to take a more proximal perspective. 
As a result, Labroo and Patrick (2009) argue that individuals in a happy state tend to use 
higher levels of presentations of events and actions more than those in an unhappy state. 
Even though this research finding indicates that emotions can exert a direct influence on 
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individuals’ mental representations of events and their evaluation of persuasive messages 
construed at different levels (Labroo and Patrick, 2009), this research effort within the 
valence-based approach appears to underestimate the qualitative differences in emotional 
states and overlooks the different relationships between psychological distances and 
states. Further, other research has oppositely argued that positive emotions signal that all 
is currently well and lead people to focus on proximal rather than distant opportunities 
and goals (Andrade, 2005; Pham, 1998). Further, Labroo and Patrick (2009) appear to 
undervalue the appraisal content of emotions and its different effects on subsequent 
information processing and judgment.  
As appraisal theorists suggested, individuals experience specific emotions on the 
basis of evaluating which appraisal components are involved and how they are involved 
(Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Smith and 
Lazarus, 1993). Appraisal components ensue from interpreting events or situations 
(Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Smith and Lazarus, 1993). 
Therefore, specific emotions the individual experiences vary in terms of cognitive 
appraisals, such as certainty, pleasantness, agency, anticipated effort, and control 
(Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Roseman, Spindel, and Jose, 1990). More importantly, many 
appraisal components produced by emotion induction influence subsequent information 
processing and judgment in a congruent manner (Clore and Parrott, 1994; Lerner and 
Keltner, 2000, 2001; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Tiedens and Linton, 2001).  
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Among the different cognitive-appraisal dimensions, certainty is a particularly 
interesting dimension of emotions. Influencing individuals’ perception of events or 
situations, emotions characterized by certainty have a direct impact on subsequent 
cognitive processing and judgment in a congruent manner (Tiedens and Linton, 2001). 
Emotions associated with certainty appraisal lead individuals to make predictions about 
future events with greater certainty, whereas other emotions low on certainty appraisal 
allow them to judge future events with less confidence (Tiedens and Linton, 2001).  
In a similar vein, prior research on construal level has suggested that people 
experience certainty (probability) as one dimension of psychological distance and it plays 
an important role in determining an individual’s level of mental construal (Bar-Anan, 
Liberman, and Trope, 2006). Certainty (probability) influences a set of distinct but 
related variables (e.g., identification of ends vs. means, broad vs. specific categorization, 
global vs. local processing) that are implicated in a general shift between high-level 
construals and low-level construals (Wakslak and Trope, 2009). There is a significant 
association between the experience of certainty and level of mental construal (Trope and 
Liberman, 2010). That is, the experience of certainty leads individuals to have a low-level 
construal mindset while the experience of uncertainty results in having individuals use a 
high-level construal mindset. 
The basic premise of this dissertation is that the induction of emotions associated 
with certainty (vs. uncertainty) leads individuals to have a low-level (vs. high-level) 
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construal mindset. From an appraisal approach, different emotions result in varying 
degrees of certainty in subsequent tasks and play an influencing role as a factor informing 
the individual about the nature of the current situation (Frijda, 1988; Schwarz and Clore, 
1983). Specifically, this dissertation proposes that individuals use their emotional state as 
a psychological distance factor to have either a high-level or low-level construal mindset.  
Signaling that individuals understand well what is and will be happening, 
emotions characterized by greater certainty might lead individuals to have a low-level 
construal mindset and to represent events or actions in a more low-level and concrete 
manner based on their concrete and contextualized knowledge constructs. In contrast, 
individuals in emotions characterized by feeling uncertain might have a high-level 
construal mindset and represent objects and events based on their abstract and 
decontextualized knowledge constructs because the emotions are signaling that they are 
uncertain what is and what will be happening around them. Therefore, the following 
research question and hypotheses are put forth:  
RQ 1: Do different emotions within the same valence differ in the mental 
representation of events or actions?   
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals induced with uncertainty-related emotions construe actions at 
a higher level compared to those induced with certainty-related emotions. 
 
In addition to the hypothesized relationship between the certainty appraisal 
content of emotions and construal level, this dissertation study predicts that the certainty 
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appraisal content of emotion influences likelihood estimates for negative, uncertain 
events. The effects of certainty-related psychological distance can be captured with one’s 
estimate of the certainty of an event. Previous research on the effect of emotion and 
construal level supports implicitly or explicitly support this prediction.  
For instance, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found anger and fear, which are 
significantly different in terms of certainty appraisals, gave rise to different likelihood 
estimates for uncertain and negative events. Participants primed to feel angry responded 
that uncertain and negative events were less likely to occur than did those who were 
primed to feel fearful. Even though Lerner and Keltner (2001) paid attention to the 
different certainty appraisal content between anger and fear, they did not provide a direct 
mechanism to link emotions and likelihood estimates. It is likely that construal levels 
primed by emotion induction affect the perceived psychological distances with and the 
representation of negative uncertain events.   
From the perspective of construal level theory, uncertain events, which are 
psychologically distant, are mentally represented in a more high-level and abstract 
manner than certain events that are psychologically proximal (Wakslak et al., 2006). 
Individuals do not frequently encounter unlikely events, and they therefore usually have 
limited information about specific aspects of such occurrences. Individuals with a high-
level mindset interpret uncertain events with abstract and decontextualized knowledge 
constructs (Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wakslak et al., 2006). In contrast, those with a 
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low-level mindset construe the uncertain events based on concrete and contextualized 
knowledge constructs (Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wakslak et al., 2006). Therefore, the 
primed construal level of participants influences their likelihood estimates for events.  
Drawing on this account, it is possible that certainty-related emotions (e.g., 
happiness, anger) lead to decrease one’s likelihood estimate for uncertain events because 
one’s low-level mindset primed by certainty-related emotions imparts a sense of 
proximity. However, uncertainty-related emotions (e.g., hope, fear) might result in 
increasing one’s likelihood estimate for uncertain events because one’s high-level 
mindset produced by uncertainty-related emotion imparts a sense of distance. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is put forth:  
Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty-related emotions lead individuals to increase their likelihood 
estimates for uncertain events compared to certainty-related emotions.  
 
A growing body of research on consumer behavior and advertising has 
investigated the effect of emotions on a consumer’s response to an advertising message 
from diverse perspectives. The majority of research on the persuasive effects of emotions 
on advertising evaluations has been developed on the basis of the dual-processing 
framework (Cohen, Pham, and Andrade, 2008). The research findings with the 
framework commonly suggest that negative emotions promote more systematic and 
elaborative processing in evaluating advertising messages, whereas positive emotions 
result in heuristic and peripheral processing by signaling that individuals have enough 
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knowledge constructs for interpreting the messages (Bohner et al., 1992; Mackie and 
Worth, 1989).  
Adopting the certainty appraisal component of emotions, Tiedens and Linton 
(2001) found that uncertainty-related emotions lead individuals to engage in evaluating 
advertising messages in a systematic way, whereas certainty-related emotions result in 
the processing the advertising messages in a heuristic way. However, little research 
attention has been paid to the fit between certainty-related emotions and ad messages 
framed at different construal levels. From the perspective of construal level theory, 
product benefits related to consumption goals can be framed differently in distinct 
advertising messages with an emphasis on desirability or feasibility (Lee, Keller, and 
Sternthal, 2010; Trope and Liberman, 2010). In particular, desirability is manipulated 
within an ad message by describing a product in terms of expected benefits that highlight 
why one should use the product, while feasibility is expressed within an ad message by 
illustrating the product in terms of its features that stress how one can use them ((Lee, 
Keller, and Sternthal, 2010).  
As described, emotions associated with certainty (vs. uncertainty) might trigger an 
individual’s low-level (vs. high-level) construal mindset. Extending this prediction, it can 
be suggested that individuals induced to feel certainty-related emotions would be more 
favorable toward ad messages and advertised products when products are described in 
terms of feasibility rather than desirability and that the opposite would be found for those 
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induced to feel uncertainty-related emotions. Thus, the following hypothesis is put forth:  
Hypothesis 3: Individuals induced with certainty-related emotions will view an ad 
message focused on feasibility more favorably than an ad message focused 
on desirability; individuals induced with uncertainty-related emotions will 
view an ad messages focused on desirability more favorably than an ad 
message focused on feasibility.  
 
In addition, different product attribute types in ad messages (e.g., alignable vs. 
nonalignable) could be construed either at a high or low level (Malkoc, Zauberman, and 
Ulu, 2005). According to the theory of structural alignment (Gentner and Markman, 1994, 
1997; Markman and Medin, 1995, Medin, Goldstone, and Markman, 1995), product 
attributes can be classified into three groups: commonalities (identical attribute levels 
across alternatives), alignable differences (common attributes that have different levels 
across alternatives), and nonalignable differences (aspects that do not have a 
corresponding attribute in other alternatives).  
For example, when comparing when comparing Naproxen and Aleve, the 
argument that Naproxen relieves inflammation-based pain for 12 hours, and Aleve does 
so for only 8 hours, emphasizes an alignable difference. In contrast, the claim that 
PopTarts have double icing, while Toaster Strudel is made with real fruit points to a 
nonalignable difference. According to the literature on structural alignment, individuals 
usually rely on alignable differences more than nonalignable differences in making 
decisions because it is more difficult to process nonalignable differences (Zhang and 
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Markman, 2001). However, according to Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu (2005), when 
individuals have a high-level construal mindset, they rely more on nonalignable 
differences than alignable differences in decision processes and show a greater preference 
for nonalignable-better products. This finding indicates that comparing nonalignable 
attributes between products demands higher-level construal than comparing alignable 
attributes (Trope and Liberman, 2010). This result posits the positive association between 
nonalignable (vs. alignable) attribute differences and abstract (vs. concrete) mental 
representation. Consumers’ responses to alignable differences versus nonalignable 
differences in a comparative advertising context may vary according to the certainty 
appraisal content of emotions. This study predicts that individuals feeling uncertainty-
related emotions eliciting a higher-level construal mindset would favor the nonalignable-
better brand and its ad message over the alignable-better brand and its ad message in a 
comparative advertising context. The additional two hypotheses are put forth: 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals induced with uncertainty related emotions will prefer the 
nonalignable-better brand to the alignable-better brand. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals primed to feel uncertainty-related emotions will evaluate an 
advertising message illustrating the nonalignable-better brand more 




Chapter 4: Experiments 
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS 
Four online experimental studies were conducted to test the proposed hypotheses 
and the research question six pretests were carried out for developing stimuli. In these 
studies, participants’ four emotional states (i.e., happy, hopeful, angry, fearful) were 
manipulated by means of asking them to recollect emotion-related personal experiences 
(Study 1) or combining emotion-inducing news stories with the recollection of emotion-
related experiences (Study 2-4).  
To recruit participants for this dissertation research, I used Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (AMT). It is an online labor market where employees (called workers) are recruited 
by employers (called requesters) for the execution of tasks (called HITs, acronym for 
Human Intelligence Tasks) in exchange for a wage (called a reward). Recent research has 
documented that data obtained through AMT are at least as reliable as those obtained via 
traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, and 
Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants were paid $1.38-$2.00 for completing an experimental study.  
Study 1 explored the positive relationship between emotions characterized by 
certainty appraisals (vs. by uncertainty appraisals) and mental representations of events at 
a lower-construal (vs. higher-construal) level. The effects of emotions on likelihood 
estimates for uncertain events were also investigated. The predicted effects of emotions 
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on construal level and uncertainty judgment were retested in Study 2. Further, Study 3 
tested the third hypothesis that the certainty appraisal content of emotions has a different 
impact on the evaluation of advertising messages focusing on feasible attributes versus 
desirable end states. To develop ad stimuli, two pretests were conducted. Study 4 
investigated how uncertainty-related emotions (vs. certainty-related emotions) would 
respond to two different ad messages featuring products better on alignable attributes or 
better on nonalignable attributes in the context of comparative advertising.  
STUDY 1 
Overview  
The objective of Study 1 was to empirically investigate whether the certainty 
appraisal component of emotions has a direct influence on mental construal levels and 
likelihood judgments about uncertain events. Specifically, in Study 1, it was expected 
that uncertainty related emotions (i.e., hope, fear) would lead participants to have a 
higher-level construal mindset and rate uncertain events as more likely to happen, while 
certainty related emotions (i.e., happiness, anger) would cause participants to have a 
lower-level construal mindset and evaluate uncertain events as less likely to occur. Four 
emotional states were induced by an imagery technique. Their different effects on mental 
construal levels and likelihood judgments about uncertain events were evaluated.    




A single-factor, between-subjects experimental design with four participant 
groups was employed to examine the effects of the certainty appraisal content of 
emotions on individuals’ construal levels and likelihood judgments about uncertain 
events beyond mere valence. To test the first and second hypothesis, happiness (positive, 
certain), hope (positive, uncertain), anger (negative, certain), and fear (negative, uncertain) 
were selected because they were found to be significantly different in terms of certainty 
appraisals (Frijda, 1993; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985) and to exert certainty-congruent 
effects on subsequent judgment and information processing in the previous research 
(Tiedens and Linton, 2001). These emotional states were manipulated, using an imagery 
technique (see Appendix A).  
Subjects 
A total of 163 participants were recruited through AMT. Among the participants, 
39.9% (n=65) were male and 60.1% (n=98) were female. The subjects came from the 
general population, which contributed to the external validity of the study results. The 
participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 72 (M = 39.42). More than 80% of the participants 





Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
   
Gender   
 Male 65 39.9 
 Female 98 60.1 
   
Age   
 19-29 51 31.3 
 30-39 43 26.4 
 40-49 23 14.1 
 50-59 26 16.0 
 60+ 20 12.3 
   
  Education   
   High School /GED 22 13.5 
   Vocational/Technical School (2-year) 7 4.3 
   Some College 59 36.2 
   College Graduate (4-year) 51 31.3 
   Master’s Degree 17 10.4 
   Doctoral Degree 0 0.0 
   Professional Degree (JD, MD) 6 3.7 
   Other 1 0.6 
   
Table 4.1: Sample Demographics from Study 1 
Procedure 
This experimental study was carried out online. Before the participants had access 
to the study site, they were instructed that this online task consisted of three unrelated 
studies. The instruction also indicated that they were likely to complete the task within 30 
minutes because the three unrelated studies were short. They were also informed that the 
purpose of the study was to understand emotion-related issues and judgments. Since the 
experiment was conducted online, signed informed consent was not obtained. Instead, 
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participants’ voluntary act of clicking on the “Accept HIT” button and filling out the 
questionnaire was considered to constitute informed consent.  
After clicking the “Accept HIT” button, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the following four experimental conditions: 1) the happy emotional condition, 2) the 
hopeful emotional condition, 3) the angry emotional condition, and 4) the fearful 
emotional condition.  
The “first” study on emotional memories, which served as an emotion induction, 
was introduced. The participants, in an open-ended questionnaire, were instructed to 
remember, relive, and recall events that had made them feel a specific emotion (i.e. happy, 
hopeful, angry, or fearful) and to write a personal story related to the feeling state (Smith 
and Ellsworth, 1985). This manipulation is explained in more detail below. In brief, the 
participants were first asked to recall a past emotional experience and, when they were 
ready, they were asked to answer a series of six questions about the emotional experience 
by describing their personal experience in more detail (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985) (See 
also Appendix A). 
After answering the six questions, participants also responded to a shortened 
version of Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) appraisal questionnaire with regard to the 
certainty and valence appraisal dimensions. This shortened appraisal questionnaire served 
as a manipulation check. All five items were rated on 11-point scales ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 11 (extremely).  
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In the “second” study, participants were informed that the requester was seeking 
their help in understanding what certain behaviors mean to people. They were instructed 
to select which of two ways best describe how they thought about certain actions based 
on their first impression. After this instruction, participants were presented with two 
alternative descriptions for 19 different target behaviors and were asked to choose the 
description that they personally believed to be more appropriate for each pair. In 
particular, each activity was followed by two descriptions. One description was 
associated with abstract construal and addresses the “why” aspect of the activity 
(Vallacher and Wegner, 1989). The other was associated with concrete construal and 
addresses the “how” aspect of the activity (Vallacher and Wegner, 1989). An overall 
score was obtained by adding the number of abstract descriptions selected by a 
participant across 19 behaviors (see Appendix B). 
Next, the participants were asked to read another instruction for the “third” study. 
The instruction began with explaining that there were some life events that were either 
certain or uncertain. Participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which four 
events would happen to them compared to other individuals of the same sex and age (see 
Appendix B). Lastly, participants answered basic demographic questions and completed 
this task by obtaining their confirmation code that was randomly generated and was 




Prior research has showed that emotions are easily manipulated through exposure 
to affectively charged stimuli such as music, videos, and pictures, or through the recall of 
emotionally involving experiences (Baas, De Drew, and Nijstad, 2008; Brenner, 2000; 
Gerrards-Hesse and Spies, 1994). Among these induction techniques, Study 1 employed 
the imagery technique because it has been deemed to be quite efficient and effective in 
terms of inducing distinctive and subtle emotional states (Cohen, Pham, and Andrade, 
2008). Given that the objective of Study1 was to investigate whether and how the 
certainty appraisal content of emotions influences individuals’ construal levels and 
related judgments, it was important to manipulate the four emotions independently. Thus, 
subjects’ four different emotions (happiness, hope, anger, and fear) were induced by the 
imagery technique.  
The emotion induction imagery procedure was adapted from Smith and Ellsworth 
(1985) and Tiedens and Linton (2001). To induce the four emotional states, the subjects 
in each condition were required to recall a past emotional experience that made them the 
target of each feeling (i.e. happy, hopeful, angry, or fearful). They wrote about their own 
autobiographical emotional event by answering a series of six open-ended questions in 
more detail.   
Measures 
Construal Level. The hypothesized certainty-congruent effects of emotions on 
mental construal levels were explored using the 19-item version of Behavior 
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Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher and Wegner, 1989), as adapted by Liberman and 
Trope (1998). In the BIF, midlevel neutral actions are listed along with two alternative 
descriptions for each action at a lower or higher construal level (see Appendix B).  
Specifically, participants were presented with two alternative descriptions for 19 
different target behaviors. Each item presented a target behavior (e.g., “locking a door”) 
and asked participants to choose the description that they personally believed to be more 
appropriate for each pair: one describing it in terms of its means (how an action is 
performed; e.g., “turning a key”) and one describing it in terms of its ends (why an action 
is performed; e.g., “securing a house”). Preference for the low-level identification for an 
item was coded as a 0, whereas preference for the high-level identification was coded as a 
1. These values were then summed to create an index of level of action identification 
ranging from 0 to 19, with higher scores indicating stronger preferences for high-level 
construal.  
Likelihood Judgment. To explore the certainty-congruent effects of specific 
emotions on subsequent judgments, the four items employed by Lerner and Keltner (2001) 
were adopted and slightly modified. Because Lerner and Keltner (2001) pretested and 
developed these items for their student subjects, some items were slightly revised in 
accordance with the demographic characteristic of AMT workers (i.e., age, education 
level). The four items were describing ambiguous events with respect to certainty (Lerner 
and Keltner, 2001): 1. Having gum problems, 2. Having a heart attack, 3. Being on an 
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airplane that encounters severe turbulence, 4. Lost at night for more than 15 minutes. 
These items were rated on 11-point scales ranging from 1(very unlikely) to 11 (very 
likely). Participants’ responses for the four ambiguous events were averaged to form a 
composite unlikelihood judgment measure (Cronbach’s α = .73). 
Results  
Manipulation Check.  
To check the efficacy of emotion manipulation, a shortened version of Smith and 
Ellsworth’s (1985) appraisal questionnaire with regard to the certainty and valence 
appraisal dimension was used. Participants were presented with: (1) “How well did you 
understand what was happening around you in this situation?” (2) “How well could you 
predict what was going to happen in this situation?” (3) “How uncertain were you about 
what was happening in this situation?” (reverse-coded item) (4) “How unpleasant was it 
to be in the situation you wrote about?” (reverse-coded item) (5) “How enjoyable was it 
to be in the situation you wrote about?” Responses ranged from 1 = not at all to 11 = 
extremely. The first three items were averaged to form a Certainty Index (Cronbach’s α 
= .72), and the last two items were averaged to form a Valence Index (Cronbach’s α 
= .95). To assess the effectiveness of the recollection of a past personal experience as an 




Valence. A one-way ANOVA on the Valence Index showed the significant 
difference between positive and negative emotions F(3, 159) = 253.60, p < .001). 
Participants who had undergone the happy (Mhappy = 10.41) and hopeful (Mhopeful = 8.01) 
inductions rated their experience as more pleasant than did those who had undergone the 
angry (Mangry=1.48) and fearful (Mfearful=1.50) inductions.  
Certainty. Another one-way ANOVA result revealed the predicted differences 
between certainty related emotions and uncertainty related emotions (F(3, 159) = 30.06, p 
< .01). Subsequent contrast analyses indicated that participants who were induced to feel 
happy provided significantly higher Certainty Index scores (Mhappy = 9.03) than did those 
who were induced to feel hopeful (Mhopeful = 6.93, p < .01), angry (Mangry = 7.87, p < .05), 
and fearful (Mfearful = 5.16, p < .01). In contrast, the participants who were induced to feel 
fearful (Mfearful = 5.16) rated their experience as more uncertain than did those who were 
inducted to feel happy (Mhappy = 9.03), hopeful (Mhopeful = 6.93), and angry (Mangry = 7.87) (p 
< .01). Further, the certainty ratings of participants who were induced to feel fearful were 
in the lower portion of the Certainty Index. Anger led to significantly lower Certainty 
Index scores than happy, and hope resulted in significantly higher Certainty Index scores 
than fear. Further, the difference in Certainty Index scores between the participants in the 
angry and hope condition were not significant (Mhopeful = 6.93, vs. Mangry = 7.87, p > .10).  
Hypothesis Testing  
The first hypothesis was tested via a single-factor ANOVA for BIF scores. This 
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analysis demonstrated there were significant differences in the BIF scores between four 
emotional conditions (F(3, 159) = 9.73, p < .01, η2 =.16 ). A post hoc analysis using 
Tukey's procedure revealed that participants in the fear (Mfearful = 14.49) condition had the 
highest BIF scores compared to those who were induced to feel happy (Mhappy= 8.89), 
angry (Mangry = 11.71), and hopeful (Mhopeful = 11.82) at a significant level of .05. In 
contrast, participants in the happiness condition provided significantly lower BIF scores 
than did those in the other three conditions (Mhappy = 8.89 vs. Mhopeful = 11.82, Mangry = 
11.71, Mfearful = 14.49, p < .05). The BIF scores between participants in the anger and hope 
condition showed no significant difference (Mangry = 11.71 vs. Mhopeful = 11.82, p > .99). 
The mean plots of the BIF scores are displayed in Figure 4.1. These results partially 
supported the first hypothesis. 
 
Figure 4.1: BIF Scores 












results showed that participants’ likelihood judgment about the uncertain events 
significantly varied with their emotional states (F(3, 159) = 13.27, p < .01, η2 =.20). In 
particular, participants in the fear condition had significantly higher ratings (Mfear = 6.28) 
with regards to the uncertainty judgment measure than did those in the happiness 
(Mhappiness = 4.22), hope (Mhope = 5.43), and anger condition (Manger = 5.26) as shown in 
Table 4.2 (p < .05). In contrast, participants in the happiness condition judged that 
uncertain future events would be less likely to occur than did those in the hope, anger, 
and fear condition. However, ratings of the uncertainty judgment measure between 
participants in the anger and hope condition were not significantly different.   
Contrast Mean Difference SE 95% Confidence Interval 
Happiness vs. Hope 1.22* 0.32 0.39, 2.05 
Happiness vs. Anger 1.07* 0.32 0.22, 1.91 
Happiness vs. Fear 2.06* 0.33 1.21, 2.91 
Hope vs. Anger -0.15 0.31 -0.97, 0.67 
Hope vs. Fear 0.84* 0.32 0.01, 1.67 
Anger vs. Fear 0.99* 0.32 0.15, 1.83 
* Differences are significant at the .05 level using the Tukey HSD procedure. 
Table 4.2: Differences in Means for the Likelihood Estimates  
Discussion 
The hypothesized effect of emotion on mental construal was partially supported in 
Study 1. Fear, which was lowest on the certainty measure than other feeling states, led 
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participants to have higher BIF scores. It was expected that participants in the hope 
condition had similar BIF scores compared to those in the fear condition. However, the 
difference in the BIF scores between the groups was significant. On the other hand, 
happiness and anger, which are deemed to be certainty-related emotions, resulted in 
significantly different BIF scores between participants in the two conditions. Further, the 
results indicated that the two emotions (i.e. happiness vs. hope, anger vs. fear) within the 
same valence led to significantly different BIF scores. This implies that when specific 
emotions are induced, the certainty appraisal content of them rather than their valence is 
able to influence an individual’s mental construal level.  
A similar pattern on the judgments about uncertain events was observed and 
partially supported the second hypothesis. When participants were induced to feel fearful, 
they thought that uncertain events were more likely to happen to them compared to those 
who were induced to feel happy, angry and hopeful. In contrast, the feeling of happiness 
influenced participants’ lower likelihood estimates about the events than other three 
emotional states.  
The results of Study 1 did not fully support both the first and second hypothesis. 
One possible explanation is that the certainty appraisal content of anger and hope is not 
influential enough to affect subsequent cognitive processing and judgment compared to 
happiness and fear. According to some appraisal theorists, hope is weakly associated with 
or is not strongly connected to uncertainty appraisal (Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Frijda, 
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Kuipers, ter Schure, 1989; Tesser, 1990). Anger, which is mostly distinguished from 
other negative emotions by agency appraisal, is not strongly related to certainty appraisal 
(Ellsworh and Smith 1988) or is weakly associated with uncertainty appraisal (Tessor 
1990). In a similar vein, the effects of anger and hope on construal levels and likelihood 
estimates were not significantly different in Study 1. Nonetheless, an experiment study 
might not be enough to confirm the results partially supported in Study 1. It appeared to 
be reasonable to retest the hypothesized effects of the four emotional states on construal 
levels and likelihood estimates. 
Another possible explanation is that the imagery technique used in Study 1 led 
participants to have different interpretations of the type of experience they were supposed 
to report and resulted in extra variability in emotional states induced (Andrade, 2005; 
Cohen, Pham, and Andrade, 2008). Due to the possibility of this experiment error linked 
to the imagery technique, participants might have evaluated their emotion-related 
experience in many different ways. According to the meta-analysis of emotion-induction 
techniques by Westermann et al. (1996), combining different types of emotion-induction 
techniques was found to be efficient in increasing the effectiveness of the induction. 
Therefore, I decided to prime participants’ emotional states by combining emotion-
induction news stories with the recollection of emotion-related personal experiences. 
Study 2 commenced with a pretest to select topics and develop emotion-induction news 





Two objectives guided Study 2. One was to retest the certainty-congruent effects 
of emotions on individuals’ construal levels and likelihood estimates tested in Study 1. 
Specifically, it was rested that emotions with a higher (vs. lower) certainty component 
would result in a lower-level (vs. higher-level) construal mindset and decrease one’s 
likelihood estimate for uncertain events. Another objective of Study 2 was to use a 
combined emotion-induction procedure for reducing the possible drawback of the 
imagery technique and increasing the effectiveness of induction. Pretest I was conducted 
to select news story topics and articles which served as emotion-induction materials  
Pretest I: Emotion-Inducing News Stories 
Prior research suggests that the combination of an imagery task and emotion-
induction materials can minimize the drawbacks of the imagery technique alone. In 
particular, the combination technique is effective to reduce extra variability, which results 
from different interpretations of the type of experience subjects are supposed to recall and 
imagine (Andrade, 2005; Cohen and Andrade, 2004; Kavanagh, 1987). It is also efficient 
in decreasing the likelihood of hypothesis guessing and demand artifacts (Cohen, Pham, 
and Andrade, 2008).  
Therefore, I decided to use the combination technique instead of the imagery 
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technique. Although researchers have frequently employed video clips more frequently as 
emotion-induction materials, these clips tend to induce more than one specific emotion at 
the same time and thus require the more complex inductions (Gross and Levenson, 1995). 
Thus, for this project, I opted for a more straightforward emotion induction approach, a 
story-induced task. To this end, Pretest I was designed to choose topics for the story-
induced task and develop emotion-induction news stories, which could guide participants 
to feel one specific emotion at a time (i.e. happy, hopeful, angry, fearful) as intended.  
For the pretest, 132 AMT Workers were recruited and randomly assigned to one 
of the nine news story conditions. Among the participants, 62.9% (n=83) were male and 
37.1% (n=49) were female. The participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 65 with an average 
of 33. Immediately after reading a news article, participants completed a commonly used 
emotion self-report form in which they rated the extent to which they felt for each of 14 
separate emotion terms on a seven-point scale (happy, hopeful, sad, angry, fearful, scared, 
afraid, irritated, optimistic, nervous, excited, cheerful, inspired, nervous) (See Richins, 
1997; Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock, 1999; Gross and Levenson, 1995; Lerner and 
Keltner 2001).  
To obtain a composite measure of happiness, responses for the happy, excited, 
and cheerful items were averaged (Cronbach’s α = .92) (Richins, 1997). Participants’ 
responses for the hopeful and optimistic items were averaged to form a composite hope 
measure (Cronbach’s α = .95) (Richins, 1997). I also averaged responses for the fearful, 
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scared, and afraid items to form a composite fear measure (Cronbach’s α = .96) (Lerner 
and Keltner 2001; Richins, 1997). Responses for the angry and irritated items were 
averaged to form a composite measure of anger (Cronbach’s α = .91). These measures 
showed higher levels of reliability (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Richins, 1997).  
A series of single-factor ANOVAs were performed to examine the effect of the 
nine news stories on emotion-induction manipulations. The results supported that some 
news stores were able to induce specific emotions in an intended manner (see Appendix 
A). A one-way ANOVA on the happiness measure indicated that as shown in Table 4.3, 
participants reading the Batkid story felt significantly happier than did those reading 
other news stories (F(8, 123) = 40. 23, p < .001). A one-way ANOVA on the hope 
measure provided that the hope-related materials were effective (F(8, 123) = 41. 34, p 
< .01). Participants reading the news story about 9-year-old Avery Walker who had 
overcame lymphoblastic leukemia had the highest ratings in the hope measure as shown 
in Table 4.3 (M = 6.18), followed by those reading the news story about a Boston 







News Story Happy Hopeful Angry Fearful 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Death of Texas Firefighter 1.26 0.64 1.57 0.94 1.71 .93 1.81 1.14 
Death of Sylvia Likens 1.36 0.39 1.67 0.99 3.80 1.86 2.53 1.68 
Everton Fan & Donation 3.48 1.49 4.78 1.45 1.38 1.13 1.58 1.07 
Boston Bombing Survivor 4.12 1.25 5.13 0.72 2.13 0.96 2.06 1.10 
Breivik & His Complaints 1.40 1.16 1.68 1.27 6.25 0.67 2.31 1.56 
Batkid in San Francisco 6.30 0.61 4.80 0.40 1.00 0.00 1.11 0.26 
Boston Marathon Bombings 1.63 0.88 1.84 1.32 4.90 0.82 5.75 1.10 
Gas Leak & Disaster 2.20 1.18 2.57 1.36 3.63 1.45 3.18 1.73 
Avery Walker over Leukemia 4.95 1.32 6.18 0.69 1.32 0.50 1.90 1.10 
Table 4.3: News Stories and Emotion Index Scores 
Another one-way ANOVA on the fear measure supported that the manipulation 
using the news story about Boston Marathon bombings was effective (F(8, 123) = 41.34, 
p < .001). Participants reading the news story had significantly higher ratings in the fear 
measure than did those reading other news stories. Last, a one-way ANOVA on the anger 
measure showed the manipulations were effective (F(8, 123) = 42. 03, p < .001). The 
news story about Norwegian mass-killer Anders Behring Breivik and his jail complaints 
made the participants in the condition feel most angry followed by the news story about 
the Boston Marathon Bombings (M = 6.25 vs. M = 4.90, F(1, 28) = 23.61, p < .001).  
These results indicated that news stories were able to serve as emotion-induction 
materials and were appropriate for being part of a combined manipulation procedure. As 
indicated, the imagery technique used in Study 1 required participants to maintain a 
higher level of motivation while responding to a series of six questions (Cohen, Pham, 
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and Andrade, 2008). Further, these news stories might help participants to have access to 
the similar types of experience they were asked to imagine and re-experience. This 
pretest ensured that the materials employed in Study 2 were effective.  
Main Experiment Design  
A single-factor, between-subjects experimental design was used to examine the 
effects of the certainty appraisal content of emotions on individuals’ construal levels and 
certainty-related judgments about uncertain, negative events. Both recall and story-
induced tasks were employed to manipulate participants’ four different emotional states.  
Subjects 
A total of 141 AMT workers who did not participate in the previous studies were 
recruited and completed the tasks and questionnaires for Study 2. They came from the 
general population, which might increase the external validity of the study results. 
Among the participants, 51.8% (n=73) were male and 48.2% (n=68) were female. The 
participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 73 with an average of 37. Table 4.4 presents the 










Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
   
Gender   
 Male 73 51.8 
 Female 68 48.2 
   
Age   
 19-29 52 36.9 
 30-39 37 26.2 
 40-49 24 17.0 
 50-59 17 12.1 
 60+ 11 7.8 
   
 Education   
Less than High School 1 0.7 
High School/GED 9 6.4 
Some College 48 34.0 
2-year College Degree 15 10.6 
4-year College Degree 54 38.3 
Master’s Degree 11 7.8 
Doctoral Degree 1 0.7 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 2 1.4 
   
Table 4.4: Sample Demographics from Study 2 
Procedure 
This experimental study was solely carried out online. Before the participants had 
access to the study site, they were informed that they were likely to complete four 
unrelated tasks within the 30 minutes. Instead of signed informed consent, participants’ 
voluntary act of clicking on the “Accept HIT” button and filling out the questionnaire 
replaced constituted informed consent.  
After being instructed about this online study and agreeing to participate, 
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participants were randomly assigned to one of the following four experimental conditions: 
1) the happy condition, 2) the hopeful condition, 3) the angry condition, and 4) the fearful 
condition. In Study 2, experimental induction of emotion was manipulated by combining 
a news story task with an autobiographical recall task. The emotion-induction procedure 
consisted of the first and second task.  
In the first task, participants were asked to read news stories, which had been 
found to be effective in the first pretest. In the happy condition, participants read the 
Batkid story while those in the hopeful condition read the story about Avery Walker, who 
overcame acute lymphoblastic leukemia, a blood cancer that can be deadly within a few 
months if not treated. Participants in the angry condition read the news stories about 
Norwegian mass-killer Anders Behring Breivik and his jail complaints. To induce the 
feeling of fear, participants in the fearful condition read the news story illustrating Boston 
Marathon bombings and pressure cooker bombs.  
After reading the news stories, participants were asked to complete the self-report 
emotion form in which they rated the extent to which they felt for each of 18 separate 
emotion terms (angry, happy, disturbing, optimistic, sad, fearful, irritated, hopeful, 
frustrated, scared, excited, afraid, cheerful, nervous, inspired, hostile, downhearted, 
delighted) (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock, 1999; Gross and Levenson, 1995; Lerner and 
Keltner 2001). This self-report form included more emotion terms aimed to make the 
emotion manipulation check disguised and to minimize participants’ hypothesis guessing.  
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The second task on emotional memories, which served as the second part of the 
combined induction procedure, was introduced. To reduce participant fatigue, instead of 
the induction procedure employed in Study 1, a relatively short imagery technique 
developed by Lerner and Keltner (2001) was used for this experiment. The emotion 
induction initially instructed participants to answer two open-ended questions as 
truthfully as possible. The first question asked participants to briefly describe two 
personal events that made them feel happy (hopeful, angry, fearful). The second question 
asked participants to describe in more detail "the one event that has made you most happy 
(hopeful, angry, fearful)” (see Appendix A). Immediately, after describing the event, 
participants responded to a shortened version of Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) appraisal 
questionnaire, which consisted of five items. This shortened appraisal questionnaire 
served as a manipulation check. All of these items were measured on 7-point scales 
ranging from 1(not at all) to 7 (extremely).  
The third task aimed to evaluate if temporarily induced emotion would exert a 
direct influence on participants’ level of mental construal. Participants were asked to 
complete a BIF questionnaire. The same instruction and questionnaire used in Study 1 
was provided to the participants for this task. They were instructed to choose one of two 
descriptions of the 19 behaviors (e.g., reading), one that comprises higher-level 
construals related to why considerations (e.g., gaining knowledge) and the other that 




Next, participants were instructed to read another instruction for the “fourth” task. 
Participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which four events would happen to 
them compared to other individuals of the same sex and age (see Appendix B). The four 
events adopted from Chambers, Windschitl, and Suls (2003) are low-frequency 
undesirable and uncertain events. Lastly, participants responded to basic demographic 
questions and completed this task by obtaining their task confirmation code.  
Measures 
Construal Level. The same 19-item BIF questionnaire in Study 1 was used to 
evaluate participants’ tendency to construe given information at a high versus low level 
(Vallacher and Wegner, 1989; Liberman and Trope, 1998).  
Likelihood Estimate. Instead of the four items employed in Study 1, a four-item 7-
point Likert scale developed by Chambers, Windschitl, and Suls (2003) was adapted and 
served as a dependent variable in Study 2. This scale consists of negative and uncertain 
future events (see Appendix B). All of the four items were evaluated on 7-point scales 
ranging from 1(very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). Participants’ responses for the four items 





Emotion Induction. To ensure that different news stories were successful in 
inducing emotions, participants’ responses for the happy, cheerful and delighted items 
were averaged to form a composite Happiness Index (Cronbach’s α= .96). Their 
responses for the angry and irritated items were averaged to form a composite Anger 
Index (Cronbach’s α = .90). I averaged responses for the fearful, scared, and afraid items 
to form a composite Fear Index (Cronbach’s α = .98). Participants’ averaged responses 
for the hopeful and optimistic items formed a composite Hope Index (Cronbach’s α 
= .96).   
A series of one-way ANOVAs were performed to examine the effect of each new 
story on emotion induction. The manipulation checks data supported that the differences 
among the four emotion conditions were statistically significant (See Table 4.5). A one-
way ANOVA on the Happiness Index revealed that participants reading the Batkid story 
felt happier than did those reading other news stories (F(3, 137) = 208.07, p < .001; 
Mhappiness = 5.73 vs. Mhope = 5.01, Manger=1.39, Mfear=1.13, p < .05). Participants in the anger 
condition indicated that they felt angrier than did those in other three conditions (F(3, 137) 
= 193.25, p < .001; Manger = 5.82 vs. Mhappiness = 1.13, Mhope = 1.29, Mfear = 4.91, p < .01).  
Participants reading the news story about Avery Walker who had overcome a 
deadly disease felt more hopeful than did those in three other conditions (F(3, 137) = 
173.91, p < .001; Mhope = 5.96 vs. Mhappiness = 5.21, Manger =1.43, Mfear =1.63, p < .05). Lastly, 
-72- 7
2 
a one-way ANOVA on the Fear Index showed the news story about the Boston Marathon 
bombings made participants feel more fearful than those in other conditions (F(3, 137) = 
144.67, p < .001; Mfear = 6.05 vs. Mhappiness = 1.26, Mhope =1.66, Manger =1.68, p < .05). 
News Story Happy Hopeful Angry Fearful 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Breivik & His Complaints 1.38 0.91 1.43 1.02 5.82 1.12 1.68 1.23 
Batkid in San Francisco 5.73 1.02 5.21 0.99 1.13 0.61 1.26 0.75 
Boston Marathon Bombings 1.13 0.34 1.63 1.16 4.91 1.40 6.05 1.32 
Avery Walker over Leukemia 5.00 1.36 5.96 1.08 1.29 0.86 1.66 1.03 
Table 4.5: News Stories & Emotion Induction 
Valence & Certainty. As explained previously, Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) 
appraisal questionnaire with regard to the certainty and valence appraisal dimension was 
employed to verify manipulation of emotion induction. The three certainty items were 
averaged to form a Certainty Index (Cronbach’s α = .62), and the two valence items were 
averaged to form a Valence Index (Cronbach’s α = .97). The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of the certainty measure was .62 and was above the acceptable value of .6 
(Hair et al., 2006; Kaiser, 1974). According to Hair et al., (2006), Cronbach’s alpha 
values from .6 to .7 are deemed to be the lower limit of acceptability. 
A one-way ANOVA on the Valence Index showed the predicted difference 
between positive and negative emotions (F(3, 137) = 177.67, p < .001; Mhappy = 6.39, 
Mhopeful=5.28 vs. Mangry=1.22, Mfearful=1.13, p < .01). Another one-way ANOVA on the 
Certainty Index showed significant differences among participants in the four emotion 
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conditions (F(3, 137) = 19.47, p < .001; Mhappy = 5.36, Mhopeful = 4.09, Mangry=4.56, 
Mfearful=3.26). In particular, participants who had undergone the happy (Mhappy = 5.36) 
induction rated their happy experience as more certain than did those who had undergone 
the hopeful (Mhopeful = 4.09), angry (Mangry=4.56), and fearful (Mfearful=3.26) inductions (p 
< .01). In contrast, participants in the fearful condition had lower ratings in the Certainty 
Index than did those in other conditions (p < .01). The ratings in the Certainty Index 
between participants in the angry and hopeful conditions were not significantly different 
(p > .35).    
Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesized effect of emotion on construal level was retested via a single-
factor ANOVA for BIF scores. The result demonstrated there were significant differences 
in the BIF scores between the four emotional conditions (F(3, 137) = 11.15, p < .01, η2 
=.20). Subsequent contrast analysis using Tukey's procedure revealed that participants in 
the fear condition had higher BIF scores (Mfearful = 14.47) relative to those who were 
induced to feel happy (Mhappy = 8.14, p < .01), angry (Mangry = 11.58, p < .05), and hopeful 
(Mhopeful = 11.47, p < .05). In contrast, participants in the happiness condition provided 
significantly lower BIF scores than did those in other three conditions (Mhappy = 8.14 vs. 
Mhopeful = 11.47, Mangry = 11.58, Mfearful = 14.47, p < .05). The BIF scores between 
participants in the anger and hope condition were not significantly different (Mangry = 
11.58 vs. Mhopeful = 11.47, p > .95). Table 6 presents the differences in the BIF scores 
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between the four conditions. These results partially supported the first hypothesis.  
Contrast Mean Difference p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
Happiness vs. Hope 3.33* < .05 0.52, 6.14 
Happiness vs. Anger 3.44* < .05 0.63, 6.25 
Happiness vs. Fear 6.33* < .01 3.48, 9.18 
Hope vs. Angry 0.11 > .99 -2.90, 2.68 
Hope vs. Fear 3.00* < .05 0.17, 5.83 
Angry vs. Fear 2.89* < .05 0.06, 5.72 
Table 4.6: Differences in Means for the BIF Scores in Study 2 
The second hypothesis proposed that uncertainty related emotions would lead 
individuals to increase their likelihood estimates for uncertain events compared to 
certainty related emotions. A single-factor ANOVA was run on the Likelihood Estimate 
Index, and the results showed that participants’ likelihood judgment about the uncertain 
events significantly varied with their emotional states (F(3, 137) = 13.21, p < .01, η2 
=.22).  
In particular, participants in the fear condition had significantly higher ratings of 
the likelihood estimate measure than did those in other emotion conditions (Mfearful = 4.59 
vs. Mhappy = 3.27, Mangry = 3.98, Mhopeful = 3.86, p < .05). In contrast, participants in the 
happiness condition judged that the uncertain future events would be less likely to occur 
than did those in the hope (Mhappy = 3.27 vs. Mhopeful = 3.86, p < .05), anger (Mhappy = 3.27 vs. 
Mangry = 3.98, p < .01), and fear (Mhappy = 3.27 vs. Mfearful = 4.59, p < .01) condition. 
However, ratings of the likelihood estimate measure between participants in the anger 
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and hope condition were not significantly different (p > .90). Table 7 presents the 
differences in ratings of the likelihood estimate measure between the four conditions. 
These results partially supported the second hypothesis.  
Contrast Mean Difference P-value 95% Confidence Interval 
Happiness vs. Hope 0.59* < .05 0.05, 1.13 
Happiness vs. Anger 0.71* < .01 0.17, 1.25 
Happiness vs. Fear 1.32* < .01 0.77, 1.86 
Hope vs. Angry 0.12 > .90 -0.65, 0.42 
Hope vs. Fear 0.73* < .01 0.18, 1.27 
Angry vs. Fear 0.61* < .05 0.07, 1.15 
Table 4.7: Differences in Means for the Likelihood Estimate Measure in Study 2 
Discussion 
Instead of the imagery induction technique, the combined emotion-induction 
procedure was employed in Study 2. By combining emotion-induction news stories with 
the recollection of emotion-related personal experiences, Study 2 intended to minimize 
extra variability in participants’ emotional states induced and the likelihood of demand 
artifacts. This experimental study retested the hypothesized effects of certainty 
(uncertainty) related emotions on construal levels and likelihood estimates. Study 2 
replicated the results of Study 1 and partially supported the first and second hypothesis. 
The results across the two studies show that the certainty appraisal content of 
emotions should be influential enough to affect subsequent cognitive processing and 
judgment. As in Study 1, fear, which is strongly associated with uncertainty appraisal, 
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caused individuals to represent objects and actions at a more abstract level and to increase 
their likelihood estimates for negative uncertain events. In contrast, happiness 
distinguished from the other three emotions by strong certainty appraisal led individuals 
to represent objects and actions at a more concrete level and to decrease their likelihood 
estimates for negative uncertain events. Contrary to the predictions, anger and hope were 
not significantly different in BIF scores and ratings of the likelihood estimates.  
Further, fear and hope have been deemed to be associated with uncertainty, 
signaling individuals to feel unsure of what is happening in the current situation and 
about what will happen next (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Tiedens and Linton, 2001). 
Compared to fear, hope, however, appears to be less related to uncertainty and to be less 
influential in processing information and making judgments in a certainty-congruent 
manner. According to the results of Study 2, anger seems to be less associated with 
certainty relative to happiness, and the certainty appraisal content of anger is not as 
influential as that of happiness. These findings are consistent with previous appraisal 
research suggesting the certainty appraisal content of anger and hope is less salient 
compared to the other emotions (e.g. happiness, fear) (Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Frijda, 
Kuipers, ter Schure, 1989; Tesser, 1990).  
The results of Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that certainty rather than valence can 
play a more important role in determining the levels of mental construal and likelihood 
estimates for negative, uncertain events. For instance, happiness and hope, which are both 
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positive emotions, resulted in significantly different BIF scores and likelihood estimates. 
In a similar vein, participants in the anger and fear condition showed significant 
differences in construal levels and likelihood estimates. These results show the 
limitations of the valence-based approach when investigating the effects of emotional 
states on construal levels and related judgments.  
The next study extended the above findings by investigating the effects of the four 
emotions on responses to advertising messages presented at either a high or level of 
construal. Before the main experiment for Study 3, two pretests were conducted for 
selecting a product (Pretest II) and developing ad messages to describe product benefits 
and attributes at different construal levels. (Pretest III).    
STUDY 3 
Overview 
The findings of Study 1 and Study 2 indicate that uncertainty related emotion is 
more likely to increase abstract, high-level construal, while certainty related emotion is 
more likely to result in concrete, low-level construal. Extending these findings, the 
objective of Study 3 was to empirically examine the fit between emotions and construal 
levels enhance the effectiveness of advertising. My prediction was that individuals 
primed to feel uncertainty related emotion would be more favorable toward an 
advertising message representing the desirability of the advertised product (high-level 
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construal) rather than the feasibility of the product (low-level construal) and that the 
opposite would be found for those primed to feel certainty related emotion. Pretest III 
aimed to develop two different messages representing product benefits at different 
construal levels.  
Pretest II: Product Selection 
As suggested by previous research, it is desirable for products to not be too 
familiar to subjects in order to control for the effect of familiarity on advertising 
messages (Kent and Allen, 1994). A brief pretest was thus administrated with 38 
participants. It measured familiarity of several products by adopting and modifying Kent 
and Allen’s (1994) two items on “How familiar are you with _____?” and “How 
knowledgeable are you about _____?” These two items were evaluated on 7-point scales 
ranging from 1(Not at all) to 7(Extremely) and were averaged to a composite familiarity 
measure. Elliptical trainers were chosen as a target product for two reasons. First, as 
indicated, individuals were not too familiar with elliptical trainers compared with other 
products (See Table 8). Second, it was found that elliptical trainers’ benefits could be 






Product Category Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Vacuum Cleaner 4.00 7.00 5.87 0.82 
DSLR Camera 1.00 7.00 3.08 1.89 
Running Shoes 2.00 7.00 4.87 1.58 
Popcorn 4.50 7.00 6.13 0.75 
Treadmill 2.00 7.00 5.16 1.31 
Elliptical Trainer 1.50 7.00 4.22 1.73 
Streaming Media Player 2.00 7.00 5.27 1.16 
Table 4.8: Product Familiarity 
Pretest III: Choice of Advertising Messages 
From the perspective of construal level theory (Trope and Liberman, 2010), a 
high-level construal ad focuses on desirability, highlighting why one should use the 
advertised product to achieve desired benefits. Whereas, a low-level construal ad focuses 
on feasibility, stressing how one can effectively use the product’s tangible features. By 
adapting the stimuli used in the previous research study by Lee, Keller, and Sternthal 
(2010), two ad messages with different construal levels were produced  
First, a fictitious brand (The Trekstar A40) was created for experimental purposes 
in order to eliminate prior familiarity with, and attitude toward existing brands and 
products. By adapting the stimuli used by previous research (Lee, Keller, and Sternthal, 
2010), a high-level construal ad message for the Trekstar A40 elliptical trainer had a 
headline, “THE ULTIMATE AEROBIC MACHINE FOR A GREATWORKOUT!” 
followed by a subheadline, “WHY EXERCISE?” The ad message focused on two 
benefits that addressed high-level concerns of why one would exercise: “The A40 gives 
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your body complete conditioning while you achieve cardiovascular training” and “It 
ensures that you get buff” (Lee, Keller, and Sternthal, 2010; Trope, Liberman, Wakslak, 
2007) (see Figure 4.2) 
 
Figure 4.2: High-level Construal Ad for Study 3 
On the other hand, a low-level construal ad message for the Trekstar A40 began 
with “THE ULTIMATE AEROBIC MACHINE WITH THE RIGHT FEATURES!” and 
“HOW TO EXERCISE?” The ad messages emphasized how some features of the A40 
worked for its users: “no-impact stepper designed to cushion each step” and “multiple 
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incline setting complements the precise, patented geometry of the stride” (see Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: Low-level Construal Ad for Study 3 
For this pretest, 28 AMT workers were recruited. Among the participants, 67.9% 
(n=19) were male and 32.1% (n=9) were female. The participants’ ages ranged from 21 
to 58 with an average of 34. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two ad 
message conditions. Half of the participants were exposed to the high-construal ad 




After reviewing the ad messages, all the participants were subsequently asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagree with the two statements for a 
manipulation check: “The ad for the A40 focuses more on the ideas about the advantages 
its buyers achieve after using it” and “The ad for the A40 focuses more on the ideas about 
the features its buyers use while doing a workout on it.”  
They also evaluated the ads and the advertised brand by responding to a series of 
questions. The lead-in question for measuring attitudes toward the ad read, “How do you 
feel about the ad message for the Trekstar A40?” Participants’ responses were measured 
on a list of 9-point seven semantic differential items. The items were anchored by 
“bad/good,” “ineffective/effective,” “not impactful/impactful,” “not 
informative/informative,” “useless/useful,” “not persuasive/persuasive,” “not 
attractive/attractive” (Bezjian-Avery, Calder, and Iacobucci, 1998; Hong and Lee, 2008; 
Martin, Lee, and Yang, 2004; Williams and Drolet, 2005) (Cronbach’s α = 0.93). These 
items were averaged to form a composite ad attitude measure.  
Attitudes toward the Trekstar A40 were captured on a five-item, nine-point 
semantic differential scale. These five items were anchored by “bad/good,” “not 
attractive/attractive,” “undesirable/desirable,” “unfavorable/favorable,” 
“unnecessary/necessary” (Babin and Burns, 1997; Lepkowska-White, Brashear, and 
Weinberger, 2003; Sengupta and Johar, 2002) (Cronbach’s α = 0.90). I averaged these 
five items to construct a composite brand attitude measure.  
To ensure that both the high-level and low-level ad messages were successfully 
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manipulated through framing the desired benefits and concrete features, participants were 
asked (1) “The ad focuses more on the ideas about the benefits the A40 buyers achieve by 
using it,” and (2) “The ad focuses more on the ideas about the features A40’s buyers use 
while doing a workout on it.” The participants responded on a seven-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  
Participants in the high-construal ad condition perceived that the ad conveying 
desired benefits focused more on the advantages the Trekstar A40’s users could achieve 
as opposed to the features the Trekstar A40 would provide to its users (MHigh-construl = 5.21 
vs MLow-construal =3.50, t(27)= 3.76, p < .01). In contrast, the reverse pattern for subjects in 
the low-construal ad condition was significant (MLow-construal =6.00 vs. MHigh-construl = 3.64, t 
(27) = 3.94, p < .01). As expected, these results indicated that participants clearly 
understood the meaning of these two ads.  
However, since the objective of Study 3 was to explore the interaction between 
emotional states and ad messages framed at different construal levels, these two ads were 
intended to have similar ratings of the ad attitude and brand attitude measure. 
Independent samples t-tests on the ad attitude and brand attitude measure were conducted. 
The results showed that the two ads were not significantly different in the ad attitude 
measure (MHigh-construl = 5.87 vs. MLow-construal =5.90, t(27) = .06 p > .95) and the brand 
attitude measure (MHigh-construl = 6.00 vs. MLow-construal =6.34, t(27) = .82 p > .40). Thus, it was 
expected that the main effect of ad messages would not be significant in the main 
experiment study.  
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Main Experiment Design 
The third hypothesis was tested using a 2 (ad message framing: desirability vs. 
feasibility) x 4 (emotion: happiness, hope, anger, fear) between-subjects design. The first 
independent variable was ad message framing. The two ad messages developed and 
pretested in Pretest III were used for this experimental study. The second independent 
variable was momentarily induced emotional states. Participants’ emotional states were 
manipulated by the same combined induction procedure explained in Study 2. 
Subjects 
A total of 179 AMT workers who did not participate in the previous pretests and 
experiments were recruited. They came from the general population and completed the 
tasks and questionnaires for Study 3. Among the participants, 54.2% (n=97) were male 
and 45.8% (n=82) were female. The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 74 with an 








Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
   
Gender   
 Male 97 54.2 
 Female 82 45.8 
   
Age   
 19-29 67 37.4 
 30-39 50 27.9 
 40-49 31 17.3 
 50-50 18 10.1 
 60+ 13 7.3 
   
 Education   
Less than High School 1 0.6 
High School/GED 26 14.5 
Some College 49 27.4 
2-year College Degree 25 14.0 
4-year College Degree 58 32.4 
Master’s Degree 15 8.4 
Doctoral Degree 3 1.7 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 2 1.1 
   
Table 4.9: Sample Demographics from Study 3  
Procedure 
Like previous pretests and experimental studies, this experimental study was 
carried out online. Before the participants had access to the study site, they were 
informed that they were likely to complete three unrelated tasks within the 30 minutes. 
Instead of signed informed consent, participants’ voluntary act of clicking on the “Accept 
HIT” button and filling out the questionnaire constituted informed consent.  
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After being instructed about this online study and agreeing to participate, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the following eight experimental 
conditions: 1) the happy and high-construal ad condition, 2) the happy and low-construal 
ad condition 3) the hopeful and high-construal ad condition, 4) the hopeful and low-
construal ad condition 5) the angry and high-construal ad condition, 6) the angry and 
low-construal ad condition, 7) the fearful and high-construal ad condition, and 8) the 
fearful and low-construal ad condition.  
Four emotional states (happiness, hope, anger, fear) were induced using the 
combined emotion-induction procedures explained Study 2. Participants were instructed 
to complete a news story task and an autobiographical recall task. In the third task, half 
the participants in each emotional condition were asked to review the high-construal ad 
for the Trekstar A40. The others were asked to review the low-construal ad for the 
Trekstar A40. After reviewing the ad, all the participants were subsequently instructed to 
answer a series of questions for the assessment of the dependent variables evaluating 
their attitudes towards ads and brands, as well as purchase intentions. In addition, the 
participants responded to questions to measure their involvement with and knowledge 
about elliptical trainers (product involvement, product knowledge) and provided their 
demographic information. Lastly, they were thanked for their participation and obtained 




Ad Attitude. The dependent variables assessed the interactive effect between 
emotional states and advertising messages describing product benefits at different 
construal levels. In particular, participants’ attitudes toward the two ads were captured on 
a four-item, seven-point semantic differential scale anchored by “bad/good,” 
“ineffective/effective,” “not informative/informative,” “not persuasive/persuasive” 
(Bezjian-Avery, Calder, and Iacobucci, 1998; Martin, Lee, and Yang, 2004; Williams and 
Drolet, 2005). These four items were chosen because they were used more frequently in 
previous research on advertising. These items were averaged to an Ad Attitude Index 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.89).  
Brand Attitude. Attitudes toward the Trekstar A40 were assessed on four seven-
point semantic differential items. These items were anchored by “bad/good,” “not 
attractive/attractive,” “undesirable/desirable,” “unfavorable/favorable” (Lepkowska-
White, Brashear, and Weinberger, 2003; Sengupta and Johar, 2002) and were averaged to 
form a Brand Attitude Index (Cronbach’s α = 0.96).  
Purchase Intention. Participants’ purchase intentions were captured on a three-
item, seven-point semantic differential scale by asking how “unlikely/likely,” 
“uncertain/certain,” and “impossible/possible” it was that they would purchase the 
Trekstar A40 if they were in the market for elliptical trainers. The three items were 
averaged to form a Purchase Intention Index (Cronbach’s α = 0.84).  
Covariates. Two potential covariates were measured to control for extraneous 
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variation in the data using analysis of covariance—product involvement and product 
knowledge. Since a consumer’s product involvement and product knowledge influence 
his or her processing of new and product-related information (Johnson and Russo, 1984; 
Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983), it appeared to be important to explore whether the 
proposed interaction effect between emotional states and advertising messages construed 
at different levels on persuasion was robust regardless of the two covariates.  
Product involvement was measured on three, seven-point Likert items (“I have a 
strong interest in elliptical trainers,” “Elliptical trainers matter a lot to me,” “I get bored 
when other people talk to me about elliptical trainers”) (Bloch, 1981; Srinivasan and 
Ratchford, 1991). These items were averaged to form a composite product involvement 
measure (Cronbach’s α = 0.81). I measured product knowledge on three, seven-point 
items (“I have a lot of experience with elliptical trainers,” “As compared to the average 
person, I would say that I am highly knowledgeable about elliptical trainers,” “I would 
describe myself as being very familiar with elliptical trainers). These items were also 
adopted from Srinivasan and Ratchford (1991) and were averaged to form a composite 
product knowledge measure (Cronbach’s α = 0.93).  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Emotion Induction. To verify the emotion induction effect of the four news stories, 
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participants’ responses for the happy, cheerful items were averaged to form a Happiness 
Index (Cronbach’s α = .96). Their responses for the angry and irritated items were 
averaged to form an Anger Index (Cronbach’s α = .90). I averaged responses for the 
fearful, scared, and afraid items to forms a Fear Index (Cronbach’s α = .98). Participants’ 
averaged responses for the hopeful and optimistic items were averaged to form a Hope 
Index (Cronbach’s α = .96).   
A series of one-way ANOVAs were performed to examine the effect of each new 
story on emotion induction. Like Study 2, the news stories induced participants’ 
emotional states at a significant level. Participants in the happy condition felt happier 
than did those in other conditions (Mhappy = 5.85 vs. Mhopeful = 4.74, Mangry=1.20, 
Mfearful=1.31; F(3, 175) = 197.13, p < .001). Participants in the hopeful condition felt more 
hopeful than did those in three other conditions (Mhopeful = 5.87 vs. Mhappy = 5.13, 
Mangry=1.42, Mfearful=1.79; F(3, 175) = 190.13, p < .001). Participants induced to feel angry 
had higher ratings of the Angry Index than did those induced to feel happy, hopeful, and 
fearful (Mangry = 5.31 vs. Mhappy = 1.19, Mhopeful=1.26, Mfearful=4.67; F(3, 175) = 180.05, p 
< .001). Participants reading the fearful Boston Marathon bombing story showed higher 
levels of the Fearful Index than did those reading other stories (Mfearful = 5.71 vs. Mhappy = 
1.23, Mhopeful=1.37, Mangry =1.73; F(3, 175) = 182.77, p < .001).  
Certainty & Valence. The effect of the recollection of personal experience was 
evaluated on Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) certainty and valence appraisal items. The 
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first three certainty items were averaged to for a Certainty Index (Cronbach’s α = .73), 
and the two valence items were averaged to from a Valence Index (Cronbach’s α = .95).  
A one-way ANOVA was run on the Certainty Index, and the result revealed 
significant differences among participants in the four emotion conditions (F(3, 175) = 
17.39, p < .001). In particular, participants who were induced to feel happy (Mhappy = 5.16) 
provided significantly higher ratings in the Certainty Index than did those induced to feel 
hopeful (Mhopeful = 4.40), angry (Mangry=4.18), and fearful (Mfearful=3.36) (p < .01). By 
contrast, participants induced to feel fearful had significantly lower ratings in the 
Certainty Index than did those in other conditions (p < .01), and their scores were only in 
the lower portion of the Certainty Index. However, the difference in the Certainty Index 
scores between participants in the angry and hopeful condition was not significant (p 
> .80). Another one-way ANOVA on the Valence Index showed the difference between 
positive and negative emotions (F(3, 175) = 177.67, p < .001; Mhappy = 6.42, Mhopeful=4.21 
vs. Mangry=1.34, Mfearful=1.51, p < .01).  
Message Framing. As a check on construal level manipulation, four Likert items 
were used: “(1) The ad message emphasizes the desired effects which the A40's users 
expect by using it,” (2) “The ad message emphasizes the functional features with which 
the A40 provides its users,” (3) “The ad focuses more on the ideas about the benefits the 
A40 buyers achieve after using it,” (4) “The ad focuses more on the ideas about the 
features A40’s buyers use while doing a workout on it.” Responses ranged from 1 
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(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The responses for the first and third item were 
averaged to form a Desirability Index (Cronbach’s α = .86) while the responses for the 
remaining items were averaged to form a Feasibility Index (Cronbach’s α = .84).  
Subjects in the high-level construal ad condition had higher ratings of the 
Desirability Index than did those in the low-level construal ad condition (MDesirability = 5.61 
vs. MFeasibility = 3.47; t = 10.78, p < .001). In contrast, subjects in the low-level construal ad 
condition perceived that the ad emphasizing the Trekstar A40’s features pertained to how 
it would work (MFeasibility = 5.60 vs. MDesirability = 3.55; t = 9.97, p < .001). Thus, the 
construal framing manipulation was successful. 
Hypothesis Testing 
First, the zero-order correlations among the three dependent variables and one 
covariate were examined (see Table 4.10). All variables except product knowledge were 
significantly positively correlated with one another at the .01 level. Because the perceived 
product knowledge measure was only correlated with the product involvement measure, 
















Ad Attitude  .83* .67* .22* .06 
Brand Attitude   .70* .30* .10 
Purchase Intentions    .31* .05 
Product Involvement     .72* 
Product Knowledge      
* Notes: significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). n = 179 for all tests. 
Table 4.10: Correlations between Dependent Variables and Covariates 
Three separate 2 (construal level: high-level vs. low-level) x 4 (emotion: 
happiness, hope, anger, fear) ANOVAs were conducted for each of the dependent 
measures (i.e., ad attitude, brand attitude, purchase intention). The results yielded no 
significant main effects for emotion and construal level. However, the interaction of 
construal level and emotion was significant for ad attitude (F(3, 171) = 9.57, p < .01), 
brand attitude (F(3, 171) = 9.03, p < .01), and purchase intent (F(3, 171) = 8.77, p < .01) 








Dependent variables Factor df F-value p-value Partial  
Ad Attitude Emotion 3 1.53 .21 .03 
 Construal 1 .03 .87 .00 
 Emotion x Construal 3 9.57 .00 .15 
Brand Attitude Emotion 3 2.10 .10 .04 
 Construal 1 .32 .57 .00 
 Emotion x Construal 3 9.03 .00 .14 
Purchase Intention Emotion 3 1.70 .17 .03 
 Construal 1 .02 .89 .00 
 Emotion x Construal 3 8.77 .00 .13 
Table 4.11: Univariate Analysis of Variance Results from Study 3 
Follow up contrasts revealed that the effects were in the hypothesized directions. 
Participants in the fear condition rated the high-level construal ad message focusing on 
desirability more positively (Mad attitude = 5.11, Mbr attitude = 5.58, Mpi = 5.05) than the low-
level construal ad focusing on feasibility (Mad attitude = 3.70, Mbr attitude = 4.15, Mpi = 3.71) (p 
< .01). By contrast, for participants in the happiness condition, the low-level construal ad 
was rated more favorably (Mad attitude = 5.24, Mbr attitude = 5.43, Mpi = 5.16) than the high-level 
construal ad (Mad attitude = 3.88, Mbr attitude = 4.22, Mpi = 3.80) (p < .01). However, the 
responses of participants in the hope and anger condition to the high-level and low-level 
construal ad message were not significantly different (ps < 1.0). Table 4.12 presents the 






Happiness Hope Anger Fear 
 HLCA LLCA HLCA LLCA HLCA LLCA HLCA LLCA 
Ad 
attitudes 
(α = 0.89) 
3.88 5.24 4.15 4.00 4.10 4.18 5.11 3.70 
         
Brand 
attitudes 
(α = 0.96) 
4.22 5.43 4.61 4.33 4.29 4.38 5.58 4.15 
         
Purchase 
intentions 
(α = 0.84) 
3.80 5.16 4.04 4.02 3.96 4.06 5.05 3.71 
N 22 21 25 22 23 21 22 23 
*HLCA = High-level Construal Ad/ LLCA = Low-level Construal Ad 
Table 4.12: Cell Means and Sample Sizes 
In addition, a series of 2 (construal level: high-level vs. low-level) x 4 (emotion: 
happiness, hope, anger, fear) ANCOVAs with the product involvement measure were 
conducted. The results yielded no significant main effects for emotion and construal level. 
The interaction of construal level and emotion was still significant for ad attitude (F(1, 
170) = 8.56, p < .01), brand attitude (F(1, 170) = 7.89, p < .01), and purchase intent (F(1, 
170) = 7.98, p < .01). The cell means for the dependent variables barely changed.  
Discussion  
It is worth noting that the persuasiveness of advertising messages presenting 
product benefits at a low or a high construal level can vary according to the certainty 
appraisal content of emotions. As shown in Study 1 and Study 2, the certainty 
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(uncertainty) appraisal components of emotions influence one’s construal level. 
Consistently, the findings of Study 3 suggest that this certainty appraisal affects one’s 
pursuits of consumption goals construed at different levels (e.g., desirability, feasibility). 
The results of Study 3 affirmed that individuals who were induced to feel fearful 
responded to the high-level construal ad focusing on desirability than the low-level 
construal ad focusing on feasibility more favorably. The reverse pattern was true for 
individuals induced to feel happiness. These certainty-congruent effects were not 
discovered for individuals induced to feel hopeful and angry. These results indicate that 
fear, which is distinguished from other emotions of the same valance by uncertainty 
appraisal, leads individuals to focus on the desirability of an advertised product. Thus, for 
individuals feeling fear, advertising messages illustrating a desired end-state to result 
from using the advertised product are more persuasive than messages featuring the 
tangible attributes of the product. On the contrary, happiness, which is distinguished from 
other emotions of the same valance by certainty appraisal, leads individuals to emphasize 
the feasibility of the advertised product and to focus on how the product’s features are 
helpful in pursuing imminent and proximal consumption goals.  
As discussed earlier, mental construal levels influence one’s reliance on alignable 
versus nonalignable attribute differences (Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu, 2005; Malkoc, 
Zauberman, and Bettman, 2010). Extending this notion, the next experimental study 
aimed to explore how the certainty appraisal content of emotions has an impact on the 
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processing of alignable attribute differences versus nonalignable attribute differences in 
the context of comparative advertising. Before the main experiment for Study 4, three 
pretests were conducted for selecting alignble attributes and nonablignable attributes 
between two vacuum cleaner brands (Pretest IV and Pretest V) and for developing ad 




In addition to desirability and feasibility, the description of products in ad 
messages can be differently construed depending on either alignable attributes (common 
attributes that have different levels across alternatives) or nonalignable attributes (aspects 
that do not have a corresponding attribute in other alternatives). Further, the findings of 
previous research studies suggest that individuals with a high-level construal mindset are 
more likely to compare nonalignable attributes between products although it is more 
difficult to process them relative to alignable attributes (Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu, 
2005; Malkoc, Zauberman, and Bettman, 2010), Drawing on this suggestion, the 
objective of Study 4 was to investigate whether and how consumers’ responses to 
comparative advertising employing different types of product attributes vary according to 
the certainty appraisal content of emotions. Specifically, Study 4 tested the prediction that 
individuals primed to feel emotions low on certainty appraisals would evaluate the 
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nonalignable-better product and its ad message more favorably than the alignable-better 
product and its ad message. Three pretests were conducted to develop two different types 
of ad messages. 
Pretest IV: Product Attributes  
The objective of Pretest IV was to assess the importance of the product attributes 
in order to create two different ad messages. Vacuum cleaners were chosen as a target 
product because vacuum cleaners were found to have enough salient attributes to support 
competitive advertising (Lee and Lee, 2007).  
For pretest IV, a total of 63 AMT workers provided ratings of importance for 
attributes of vacuum cleaners on a seven-point scale (1=not at all important and 7 = 
extremely important). Table 4.13 displays the attributes of vacuum cleaners and their 
importance ratings. Based on the ratings, eight attributes (two common, two alignable, 
and four nonalignable attributes) were selected for vacuum cleaners such that they were 
equivalent in favorability judgment in terms of ratings of attitudes toward ads and 
advertised brands. In particular, suction power and manufacturer warranties were selected 
as common attributes because the differences in the two attributes might significantly 
make the alignability of the attributes meaningless. Vacuum cleaners’ dust collection 
capacity and filtration systems were chosen as alignable attributes. In addition, to 
maintain a similar favorability between the two brands, four product attributes (automatic 
height adjustment, power cord length, electronic dirt sensor, and easy-empty & fingertip-
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controlled on/off switch) were picked up as nonalignable attributes.  
Product Attributes Mean SD 
1) Multiple filter systems 4.24 1.28 
2) High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter system 5.16 1.36 
3) Larger dustbin capacity 5.38 0.91 
4) 5 brush-height adjustments 4.35 1.50 
5) Automatic retractable cord 4.54 1.56 
6) Manufacturer warranty period 5.63 1.14 
7) Easy empty dirty tank (cup) 4.87 0.99 
8) Washable dustbin 5.24 1.16 
9) Larger cleaning path 4.89 1.26 
10) Washable filter 5.19 1.15 
11) Multiple height adjustment 4.40 1.56 
12) Automatic height adjustment 3.86 1.46 
13) Suction power 6.54 0.71 
14) See-through dirt container (tank or cup) 4.25 1.68 
15) Fingertip-controlled on/off switch 6.05 1.49 
16) Longer power cord 5.35 1.12 
17) Automatic power adjustment 4.38 1.31 
18) Electronic dirt sensor 3.78 1.46 
19) Add-on cleaning tools 4.83 1.43 
Table 4.13: Product Attributes and Importance Ratings 
Pretest V: Alignable & Nonalignable Attributes  
In order to control overall attitude toward the brand (Abr), attitude toward the ad 
(Aad), Pretest V was conducted with the specific eight product attributes created based on 
the results from Pretest IV. For instance, vacuum cleaners’ 1800 watts suction power and 
2-year limit warranty were shared as common attributes. As alignable attributes, vacuum 
cleaners’ dust collection capacity (2.5L vs. 2.25L) and filtration system (HEPA multiple 
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filter system vs. multiple filter system) were manipulated. To create nonalignable 
differences, vacuum cleaners’ automatic height judgment, electronic dirt sensor, 
fingertip-controlled on/off switch, and 23 ft. automatic rewind cord were selected. A total 
of 50 AMT workers (Mage =24.2) participated in this pretest and were asked to indicate 
importance for the ten attributes of vacuum cleaners on a seven-point scale (1=not at all 
important and 7 = extremely important) (See Table 4.14). 
Product Attributes Mean SD 
1) 1800Watts Max Suction Power 5.14 1.20 
2) 2.5L Dust Bin Capacity 5.16 1.41 
3) 2.25L Dust Bin Capacity 4.58 1.43 
4) Multiple Filter System 5.04 0.95 
5) HEPA Multiple Filter System 5.68 1.19 
6) Fingertip-controlled On/Off switch 5.60 1.32 
7) Electronic Dirt Sensor 4.02 2.10 
8) 23ft. Automatic Rewind Power Cord 4.94 1.54 
9) Automatic Height Adjustment 4.50 1.12 
10) 2 Year Parts & Labor Warranty 5.14 1.48 
Table 4.14: Common, Alignable, and Nonalignable Attributes 
To explore the differences in the perceived importance of the alignable and 
nonalignable attributes, a series of one-sample t-tests were conducted. As shown in Table 
4.15, participants rated 2.5L dust collection capacity and HEPA multiple filter system as 
significantly more important than 2.25L dust collection capacity and multiple filter 
system. For nonalignable attributes, individuals evaluated the vacuum cleaner’s fingertip-
controlled on/off switch and 23ft. automatic rewind power cord as more important than 
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its electronic dirt sensor and automatic height adjustment (See Table 4.15).   
Contrast Mean Difference t-value p-value 
2.5L Dust Bin Capacity vs.  
2.25L Dust Bin Capacity 0.58 2.92 < 0.01 
HEPA Multiple Filter System vs.  
Multiple Filter System 0.64 3.82 < 0.01 
Fingertip-controlled on/off switch vs.  
Electronic Dirt Sensor 1.58 8.43 < 0.01 
Fingertip-controlled on/off switch vs.  
Automatic Height Adjustment 1.10 5.87 < 0.01 
23-Foot Automatic Rewind Power Cord vs.  
Electronic Dirt Sensor 0.92 4.21 < 0.01 
23-Foot Automatic Rewind Power Cord vs.  
Automatic Height Adjustment 0.44 2.02 < 0.05 
*n = 50 
Table 4.15: Differences in Perceived Importance between Product Attributes 
Pretest VI: Choice of Two Ad Messages  
Based on the results of the two previous pretests, two ad messages for the vacuum 
cleaners were developed (see Figure 4.4). First, two fictitious vacuum cleaner brands 
(Pura K380 and Klenp KC480) were created to avoid any confounding with actual brand 
names because participants might have had different prior experiences with existing 
vacuum cleaner brands. Second, the Pura K380 and Klenp KC480 shared common 
attributes (e.g., 1800 watts maximum suction power and 2-year parts and labor warranty). 
To manipulate alignable differences, the Pura K380’s was designed to be better on its 
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alignable attributes and had greater dust collection capacity and a better filtration system 
than the Klenp KC480 (2.5L vs. 2.25L dust collection capacity, HEPA multiple filter vs. 
multiple filter). In contrast, the Klenp KC 480 had better nonalignable attributes relative 
to the Pura K380 (fingertip-controlled on/off switch, 23 ft. automatic rewind cord vs. 
automatic height judgment, electronic dirt sensor). 
  PURA K380 KLENP KC480 
  
Figure 4.4: Ad Stimuli for Study 4 
Pretest VI was conducted with the two stimulus ads. A total of 28 AMT workers 
(M = 32.6) were recruited and completed this pretest. Pretest VI was administered online. 
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Upon logging on to the pretest study site, participants were instructed to review two ad 
messages. Next, participants were asked to rate the reviewed ads based on a four-item, 
nine-point semantic differential scale for assessing ad attitude, which was used in Study 3 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.90). Participants’ attitudes toward two ads messages were not 
significantly different (Mpura = 6.46 vs. Mklemp = 6.98; F(1, 26) = .96, p = 0.36) 
Main Experiment Design 
 
The fourth and fifth hypotheses were tested using a single-factor (i.e., emotion) 
between-subjects experimental design with ad appeal type (i.e., better alignable attributes, 
better nonalignable attributes) as a within-subject factor. Four emotions (happiness, hope, 
anger, fear) were induced by the same combined procedure used in Study 2 and Study 3.  
Subjects 
A total of 103 AMT workers who did not participate in the previous pretests and 
experiments were recruited. They came from the general population and completed the 
tasks and questionnaires for Study 4. Among the participants, 46.6% (n=48) were male 
and 53.4% (n=55) were female. The participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 73 with an 





Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
   
Gender   
 Male 48 46.6 
 Female 55 53.4 
   
Age   
 19-29 32 31.1 
 30-39 29 28.2 
 40-49 19 18.4 
 50-50 10 9.7 
 60+ 13 12.6 
   
 Education   
High School/GED 18 17.5 
Some College 36 35.0 
2-year College Degree 8 7.8 
4-year College Degree 28 27.2 
Master’s Degree 11 10.7 
Doctoral Degree 2 1.9 
   
Table 4.16: Sample Demographics from Study 4 
Procedure 
Study 4 was carried out online, recruiting AMT workers. A cover story instructing 
that participants would complete three unrelated, short tasks within 30 minutes was 
provided in order to minimize the possibility of demand artifacts (Swaminathan, Page, 
and Gürhan-Canli, 2007). After being instructed about this online study, participants 
logged on to the study site and were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions: 1) the happiness condition 2) the hope condition 3) the anger condition, and 4) 
the fear condition.  
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In Study 4, four emotions (e.g., happiness, hope, anger, fear) were induced using 
the same combined procedure explained in Study 2. The “first” task induced the four 
emotions using the news stories, and the “second” task asked participants to recall their 
personal emotional experience. In the “third” task, participants were asked to review the 
two ad messages developed in Pretest VI at the same time for more than 45 seconds. 
After reviewing the ad messages, participants were instructed to indicate their preferences 
by allocating 100 points between the Klenp KC480 and Pura K380. Subsequently, they 
were asked to indicate the importance for the ten attributes of vacuum cleaners on a 
seven-point scale (1=not at all important and 7 = extremely important). Finally, they 
completed a series of questions to assess their attitudes towards the two ads, followed by 
a series of ancillary measures including demographic information. 
Measures 
The dependent variables assessed the effect of emotional state on evaluating 
alignable and nonalignable differences. These included strength of preference and 
attitudes toward the two ad messages. Strength of preference was directly measured on 
participants’ allocation of 100 points between the two vacuum cleaner brands (Malkoc, 
Zauberman, and Ulu, 2005). Attitudes toward the Klenp KC480’s ad and Pura K380’s ad 
were evaluated on a four-item, nine-point semantic differential scale anchored by 
“bad/good,” “ineffective/effective,” “not informative/informative,” “not 
persuasive/persuasive” (Bezjian-Avery, Calder, and Iacobucci, 1998; Martin, Lee, and 
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Yang, 2004; Williams and Drolet, 2005). Participants’ responses for these items were 
averaged to form a single index for the Klenp KC 480 (Cronbach’s α = 0.94) and the 
Pura K380 (Cronbach’s α = 0.96). 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Emotion. A series of one-way ANOVAs on the Happiness (Cronbach’s α = .97), 
Hope (Cronbach’s α = .96), Anger (Cronbach’s α = .97), and Fear (Cronbach’s α = .97) 
Index were conducted. The emotion-induction manipulation using the news stories was 
effective. First, participants in the happy condition provided higher ratings of the 
Happiness Index than did those in other conditions (Mhappy = 6.02 vs. Mhopeful = 5.02, 
Mangry=1.38, Mfearful=1.02; F(3, 99) = 240.24, p < .001). Participants in the hopeful 
condition indicated they felt more hopeful than did those in the happy, angry, and fearful 
condition (Mhopeful = 5.98 vs. Mhappy = 5.21, Mangry=1.58, Mfearful=1.22; F(3, 99) = 148.07, p 
< .001). Participants who were induced to feel angry had higher ratings of the Anger 
Index than did those in other conditions (Mangry=5.96 vs. Mhappy = 1.10, Mhopeful = 1.33, 
Mfearful=5.18; F(3, 99) = 152.81, p < .001). Lastly, participants in the fearful condition 
reported they felt more fearful than did those in other emotion conditions (Mfearful=5.49 vs. 
Mhappy = 1.23, Mhopeful = 1.47, Mangry=2.24; F(3, 99) = 56.42, p < .001). The emotion 
induction manipulation was effective. 
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Certainty & Valence. The effect of the recollection of personal experience was 
evaluated on Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) certainty and valence appraisal items. The 
first three certainty items were averaged to for a Certainty Index (Cronbach’s α = .75), 
and the two valence items were averaged to from a Valence Index (Cronbach’s α = .91).  
A one-way ANOVA was run on the Certainty Index, and the result revealed 
significant differences among participants in the four emotion conditions (F(3, 99) = 
22.61, p < .001). In particular, participants who were induced to feel happy (Mhappy = 5.55) 
provided significantly higher ratings in the Certainty Index than did those induced to feel 
hopeful (Mhopeful = 4.47), angry (Mangry=4.21), and fearful (Mfearful=3.14) (p < .01). By 
contrast, participants induced to feel fearful had significantly lower ratings in the 
Certainty Index than did those in other conditions (p < .01), and their scores were only in 
the lower portion of the Certainty Index. However, the difference in the Certainty Index 
scores between participants in the angry and hopeful condition was not significant (p 
> .8). 
A single-factor ANOVA on the Valence Index showed the predicted difference 
between positive and negative emotions (F(3, 99) = 89.13, p < .001, Mhappy = 6.15, 
Mhopeful=5.18 vs. Mangry=1.46, Mfearful=1.42). Subsequent contrast analysis showed that 
participants who were asked to recall happy events had higher ratings in the Valence 
Index than did those asked to recall hopeful events (Mhappy = 6.15 vs. Mhopeful=5.18; p 
< .05).  
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Product Attributes. The average rating scores for the superior nonalignable 
attributes (fingertip-controlled on/off switch and 23ft. automatic rewind cord) were 
significantly higher than the inferior nonalignable attributes (automatic height judgment, 
electronic dirt sensor) (Msuperior = 5.08 vs. Minferior = 4.30; t (102) = 7.41, p < .01). On the 
other hand, participants’ rated the superior alignable attributes (2.5L dust collection 
capacity, HEPA multiple filter system) as more important than the inferior alignable 
attributes (2.25L, dust collection capacity, multiple filter system) (Msuperior = 5.06 vs. 
Minferior = 4.63; t (102) = 3.66, p < .01).  
Hypothesis Testing  
Ad Attitude. A 2 (ad claim type: superior alignable attributes vs. superior 
nonalignable attributes) x 4 (emotion: happiness, hope, anger, and fear) mixed-design 
ANOVA yielded a significant interaction between ad claim type and emotion (F(3, 99) = 
10.27, p < .01, η2 = .24). The results showed no significant differences between the 
emotional conditions in the attitudes toward the ad message for the Pura K380 (F(3, 99) 
= 1.52, p > .2). Participants in the happiness (Mhappiness = 6.59), hope (Mhope =6.18), anger 
(Manger=6.22), and fear (Mfear = 6.03) condition had similar ratings for the ad attitude 
measure for the Pura K380, which was better on the alignable attributes. For the Klenp 
K480’s ad message focusing on better nonalignable attributes, participants in the fear 
(Mfear = 7.46) condition had significantly higher ratings of the ad attitude measure than 
did those in the happiness (Mhappiness = 5.93), hope (Mhope =6.21), and anger (Mhope =6.04) 
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condition (F(3, 99) = 13.60, p < .01, η2 = .29). These results partially supported the fourth 
hypothesis. Table 4.17 presents the cell means for the attitudes toward the two ads.  
 Ad Attitude toward the Pura K380 Ad Attitude toward the Klenp K480 
 M SD M SD 
Happiness 
(n=26) 6.59 1.05 5.93 0.94 
Hope 
(n=24) 6.18 1.03 6.21 1.08 
Anger 
(n=25) 6.22 0.78 6.04 1.21 
Fear 
(n=28) 6.03 1.07 7.46 0.78 
Table 4.17: Attitudes toward the Two Ads 
Strength of Preference. In the analysis of strength of preference, I used only 
points allocated to the Klenp KC480, which was better on the nonalignable attributes than 
the Pura K380, because the points summed to 100. As explained earlier, high level 
construals lead individuals to compare nonalignable attributes between products and 
choose a nonalignable better option than an alignable better option (Malkoc, Zauberman, 
and Ulu, 2005), Extending this notion, it was expected that participants induced to feel 
emotion characterized by uncertainty appraisals (e.g., fear) would show greater 
preference for the Klenp KC480. A single-factor ANOVA on the strength of preference 
demonstrated a significant difference between emotional conditions (F(3, 99) = 9.93, p 
< .01, η2 = .23). Subsequent contrast analysis revealed that participants in the fear 
condition indicated significantly higher ratings of preference for the Klenp KC480 than 
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did those in other condition (Mfear = 57.46 vs. Mhappiness = 41.50, p < .01; Mfear = 57.46 vs. 
Mhope =47.00, p < .01; Mfear = 57.46 vs. Manger =45.68, p < .01). Nonetheless, the preference 
scores for the Klenp KC480 among the happiness, hope, and anger group were not 
significantly different (p > .5). These results partially supported the fifth hypothesis 
Discussion  
The fourth study provides support for the prediction that people respond to the 
structural alignment of attributes differently when feeling certainty versus uncertainty 
related emotions. The results demonstrated that nonalignable attributes had a greater 
influence on participants’ evaluations of advertising messages when they felt fearful 
rather than when they felt happy, hopeful, and angry. That is, the effects of structural 
alignment can be moderated by the certainty appraisal components of emotions.  
As demonstrated in the previous experimental studies, the feeling of fear, which is 
significantly associated with uncertainty appraisal, caused individuals to represent objects 
and actions at a more high-level construal and to pursue desirable end states in terms of 
consumption goals. Further, the findings of Study 4 reveal that fear can lead individuals 
to increase their reliance on nonalignable attributes in spite of the difficulty of processing 
them relative to alignable attributes. This finding also implies that compared to fear, hope, 
which was found to be barely associated with uncertainty appraisal, did not show an 
increased reliance on nonalignable attributes. In addition, the results point to the 
limitations of the valence-based approach. In particular, individuals induced to feel angry 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The previous chapter presented the results for both the pretests and the four 
experimental studies. It focused on the quantitative results and illustrated how each 
hypothesis was either supported or not. This chapter concludes this discourse by 
discussing those results in light of the original research questions. In so doing it 
acknowledges this research’s contributions to the discipline as well as managerial 
implications, admits the existing limitations of this dissertation study, and discusses 
future research opportunities. 
The overarching objective of this research is to investigate how (and whether) 
discrete emotions exert an influence on mental construal levels, likelihood judgments, 
and responses to advertising messages beyond the valence-based framework. The central 
idea of this dissertation research is that the appraisal components of emotions, 
specifically certainty appraisals, could differentiate emotions of the same global valence 
and lead individuals to have different construal mindsets. Further, it was hypothesized 
that individuals induced to experience uncertainty related emotions would construe 
behaviors at a higher level rather than at a lower level, evaluate advertising messages 
focusing on desirability than feasibility more favorably, and prefer nonalignable better 
attributes to alignable better attributes in the context of competitive advertising. The 




This research empirically explores the hypothesized effects of four different 
emotional states (i.e., happy, angry, hopeful, fearful) in online experimental settings. The 
results from Study 1 through Study 4 consistently indicate that happiness and fear are 
significantly more linked to certainty appraisals than anger and hope. Fear is strongly 
associated with the sense of uncertainty while happiness is connected to the sense of 
certainty. However, when people are induced to feel angry and hopeful, certainty 
appraisals are not strongly accessible compared to happiness and fear. This finding is in 
agreement with previous research studies postulating that the certainty appraisal content 
of anger and hope is less salient compared to that of happiness and fear (Frijda, Kuipers, 
ter Schure, 1989; Tesser, 1990). Further, it is worth noting that the certainty index scores 
of individuals in the angry and hopeful conditions converge to the value of four in the 7-
point scales (Study 2, 3, & 4). Accordingly, it can be suggested that the sense of certainty 
(or uncertainty) is more involved with the feeling of specific emotions (e.g., happy, 
fearful) than other emotions (e.g., angry and hopeful).  
The predicted effects of certainty (vs. uncertainty) related emotions on construal 
mindsets were captured on the BIF, which is as an effective instrument for measuring an 
individual’s mental construal levels (Trope and Liberman, 2010). Individuals induced to 
feel fearful had higher BIF scores than those induced to feel happy, angry, and hopeful. 
The current research suggests that the feeling of fear leads people to construe behaviors at 
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a higher level rather than at a lower level. On the other hand, individuals had lower BIF 
scores when feeling happy than when feeling angry and hopeful. This finding provides 
support for the prediction that certainty-related emotion results in a lower-level construal 
mindset and, thus, leads individuals to represent behaviors at a lower construal level than 
at a higher construal level. The BIF scores between the anger and hope condition showed 
no significant difference. Thus, these findings suggest that certainty appraisal 
components of emotions can trigger an individual’s mental construal at a higher or lower 
level.  
Study 1 and Study 2 also examined the effect of four emotional states (i.e., 
happiness, anger, hope, fear) on likelihood judgments about negative, uncertain events. In 
accordance with the previous research by Lerner and Keltner (2001), the findings of this 
research indicates that individuals primed to feel fearful rate uncertain events as more 
likely to happen than do those primed to feel happy, angry, and hopeful. In addition, 
individuals induced to feel happy evaluate the uncertain events as less likely to occur 
relative to those induced to feel angry and hopeful.  
These findings highlight how emotions with different certainty components 
influence likelihood judgments about uncertain events. From the perspective of construal 
level, uncertain events are psychologically more distant and are construed at a higher 
level than certain events (Trope and Liberman, 2010, Wakslak et al., 2006). Extending 
this notion, the current research demonstrates that individuals feeling emotions high on 
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certainty appraisals, like happiness, perceive uncertain events as psychologically more 
distant and as less likely to occur.  
In line with the relationship between emotions and mental construal levels, Study 
3 examined whether and how certainty (uncertainty) related emotions would exert an 
influence on individuals’ responses to advertising messages framed at different construal 
levels. As previous research has shown (Lee, Keller, and Sternthal, 2010), construal 
levels were manipulated within the ad message by illustrating desirable end states at 
which consumers could arrive through using the advertised product (high-level construal) 
or by describing how consumers could use the feasible attributes which the advertised 
product would provide (low-level construal).  
The results show that the effectiveness of advertising messages framed at 
different construal levels varies according to emotional states. In particular, individuals 
induced to feel fearful rated the ad message focusing on desirable end states as more 
effective than the ad message focusing on feasible attributes in terms of ad attitude, brand 
attitude, and purchase intent and features. Whereas, the reverse pattern held true for those 
induced to feel happy. Nevertheless, for individuals induced to feel angry and hopeful, 
these two different ad messages gave rise to no difference. 
Accordingly, these results can be evidenced for the fit between certainty 
appraisals and mental construal levels. Feeling emotions with a high certainty component, 
individuals focus more on low-level and feasibility in pursuing imminent and proximal 
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goals. By contrast, individuals feeling emotions with a high uncertainty component focus 
more on high-level, desirable end-states than low-level, feasible attributes.   
Study 4 explored the effects of how emotions characterized by certainty 
appraisals would have an impact on individuals’ responses to advertising messages better 
on alignable versus nonalignable attributes. From the perspective of structural alignment 
theory (Zhang and Markman, 2001), when individuals compare the attributes of two 
products, in general, nonalignable attribute differences are more difficult to process than 
alignable attribute differences and show greater use of alignable differences. However, 
individuals with a high-level and abstract mindset rely more on nonalignable attribute 
differences than alignable attribute differences in making decisions (Malkoc, Zauberman, 
and Ulu, 2005). In agreement with this postulation, the results from Study 4 report that 
individuals induced to feel fearful show an increased reliance on nonalignable attributes 
and a shift in preference toward a product better on its nonalignable attributes in 
competitive advertising environments.  
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Theoretical Contributions 
The present research is one of the first attempts to examine the effects of emotions 
on ad messages by recognizing the relationship between certainty appraisal and construal 
level. Further, this dissertation study contributes, on several fronts, to the existing 
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literature on consumer psychology and advertising. First, this dissertation research 
extends our knowledge about emotional effects by identifying the certainty appraisals of 
emotions as an important moderator of mental construal levels. Based on certainty 
appraisals, this research distinguishes between emotions that result in a higher-level 
construal mindset and emotions that result in a lower-level construal mindset. This 
classification provides a baseline understanding of the relationship between emotion and 
construal level. Consistent with Trope and Liberman’s (2010) hypothesis, the findings of 
this research empirically ascertain that some emotions with a high uncertainty (certainty) 
component are more associated with higher-level (lower-level) mental construal than 
others.  
This dissertation research not only affirms the importance of appraisal approaches 
but also points to the limitations of valence-based approaches in research on emotion. 
Research studies from a valence-based approach primarily assume that all negative and 
all positive emotions lead to similar effects on cognitive processing, judgment and 
decision-making. The drawback of the valence-based approach is to undermine the 
appraisal component of emotions and their congruent effects on subsequent cognitive 
processing and judgments (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer, 1999; Lerner and Kelter, 2001; 
Tiedens and Linton, 2001). Instead of contrasting the effects of positive versus negative 
emotion, the focus of this research is on the appraisal dimension of certainty. The current 
investigation demonstrates that emotions of the same global valence exert different 
influences due to certainty appraisal components. For instance, although fear and anger 
are both negative emotions, their emotional effects on mental construal levels, likelihood 
judgments, and responses to advertising messages are significantly different due to 
-117- 1
17 
certainty appraisal content.  
Another noteworthy contribution of this dissertation research is to reveal an 
underlying mechanism that explains the effects of emotions on the processing of ad 
messages. Identifying the certainty appraisal component of emotions as a factor 
influencing mental construal levels, this research elucidates that uncertainty-related 
emotion causes individuals to put increased emphasis on high-level, desirable end states 
rather than low-level, feasible attributes in processing ad messages. The reverse pattern is 
also proposed for individuals experiencing certainty-related emotion.  
By adopting the concepts of nonalignable and alignable attribute differences 
(Markman and Medin, 1995; Zhang and Markman, 1998), this dissertation research also 
reports systematic differences in the way people react to the advertising as a function of 
certainty appraisals distinguishing individuals’ mental construal levels. Although 
individuals usually rely more on alignable attribute differences than nonalignable 
attribute differences in comparing products (Zhang, Kardes, and Cronley, 2002), the 
current investigation proposes that induction of uncertainty-related emotion attenuates 
common reliance on alignable attribute differences and increases the use of nonalignable 
attribute differences. That is, when a higher construal mindset is activated because of a 
sense of uncertainty, individuals show greater use of nonalignable differences in the 
context of competitive advertising.  
The findings about the effects of emotions on likelihood judgments contribute to 
the literature on comparative optimism by suggesting that the common comparative 
optimism could be diminished due to the sense of uncertainty. Individuals have a 
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tendency to believe that they are more likely than others to experience good fortune and 
less likely to suffer harm (see Chambers, Windschitl, and Suls, 2003). The findings of 
this research suggest that the feeling of fear, which results in the sense of uncertainty, can 
impede common comparative optimism whereas the feeling of happiness bolsters 
comparative optimism compared to the feeling of anger and hope.  
Managerial Implications  
This dissertation research is also relevant to practitioners of advertising and 
marketing. By providing an understanding of emotional effects on the processing of ad 
messages, this research expands the scope of both strategic and tactical approaches to 
persuasion. From a managerial perspective, knowledge about the fit between emotion and 
construal level provides a guide for the construction of advertising messages and media 
plan. As media content affect the processing of ad messages by priming message 
recipients’ cognitive and emotional states (Yi, 1990), the current research proposes that 
ad messages framed at a construal level consistent with one’s emotional state primed by 
media content would enhance the effectiveness of the messages.  
For instance, embedded in crime dramas (e.g., Hannibal, CSI, Criminal Minds), 
which stimulates the feeling of fear, TV commercials focusing on desirability can be 
significantly more effective than those focusing on the feasibility because the feeling of 
fear leads to a higher-level construal mindset; but, when placed in comedy shows, TV 
commercials concentrating on feasible attributes can be more persuasive than those 
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featuring desired end states. Given that consumers differently construe ad messages at a 
higher or lower level, depending on emotional states, advertisers should take into account 
the fit between their ad message and media content.  
Further, the fit effect can be expended into the context of comparative advertising. 
Although alignable attribute differences are used more frequently to justify decisions 
(e.g., Markman and Median, 1995), as evidenced by the findings of this research, the 
feeling of fear and the sense of uncertainty could make a cognitive shift toward relying 
more on nonalignable attribute differences in the context of competitive advertising. 
Extending this suggestion, when comparative advertising messages involve nonalignable 
attributes, these messages could be more persuasive when embedded in media content 
inducing uncertainty-related emotions.  
The insight gained from the present research also offers implications for 
developing advertising messages for products that are innately purchased in order to 
decrease the feeling of fear and uncertainty (e.g., health products, insurance services, 
security services) (Morales, Wu, and Fitzsimons, 2012). In particular, consumers who 
pay for any kind of insurance is proof that fear sells. The feeling of fear and uncertainty 
linked to purchasing these products might lead consumers to construe their consumption 
goals at a higher level. For these products, the greater persuasive impact of advertising 
messages might occur when the desirability of the advertised products are highlighted in 
the messages.  
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LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH  
As with most discovery-based investigations, this dissertation study has several 
limitations that need to be addressed. First, limitations include alternative appraisal 
dimensions of emotion, such as effort, control, and agency (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 
1988; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). These other dimensions might also exert an influence 
on mental construal levels and ad message processing. Future research should examine 
other cognitive appraisal dimensions of emotions to explore the emotional effects on 
construal levels and related ad message processing. For example, the control (self vs. 
other) appraisal components of emotions may influence the perception of social distances 
associated with construal levels.  
Although four emotional states were induced and their effects were examined in 
this research, other emotional states (e.g., worry, sadness, disgust, pride) might be an 
antecedent determining one’s construal level and influencing subsequent cognitive 
processing. By exploring the effects of a wide array of emotion, future research could 
extend the generalizability of the findings of the current research.  
Further, here only the effects of a single emotional state were taken into account, 
not examining the possibility and influence of mixed emotions. As shown in the 
experimental studies in the current research, emotion-induction materials (i.e. news 
stories) induced more than one specific emotion. For instance, experiencing fearful 
events, individuals might feel sad simultaneously. Therefore, different cognitive 
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appraisals could be accessible and be interactively involved with mixed emotions. It 
would be a meaningful research effort to scrutinize the effects of mixed emotions on 
subsequent cognitive processing.  
The findings of this research are limited to the specific purchase contexts and 
advertising messages. Future research should investigate whether similar effects will 
occur across different types of contexts and communications (e.g., self-control, health 
communication, altruistic behavior). 
From a methodological perspective, this dissertation research combined emotion-
induction news stories with the recollection of emotion-related personal experiences to 
induce specific emotions. Researchers could consider other ways to induce emotional 
states more realistically. For instance, it would be interesting to explore the potential 
influence of ad-induced emotions. Another area for future research is the direct 
assessment of actual behavior, in addition to attitudes and behavioral intentions, the 
outcomes measured here. Future research is also needed to explore whether other 
individual difference (e.g., self view, regulatory focus, and personality trait) factors 
simultaneously influence the interaction effects of emotions and messages framed at 
different construal levels. At the very least, this dissertation research should serve as an 
empirical foundation for other investigations of emotion, construal level, and persuasive 
communication.   
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Appendix A: Emotion Induction Questions & Stimuli 
1. Imagery Technique (Study 1)  
Instructions:  
 
I want you to think of a past situation or event where you felt most happy (hopeful, 
angry, fearful). Picture this situation in your mind.  
 
Try and remember as vividly as you can what this past happy (hopeful, angry, fearful) 
situation was like: Think of what happened to make you feel so happy (hopeful, angry, 
fearful), and what it felt like to be happy (hopeful, disgusting, fearful) in this particular 
situation.  
 
Please click the “>>” button below when you are ready and have this happy (hopeful, 
angry, fearful) situation in your mind, and I'll ask you questions about it.  
 
Remember you will be telling a Vulcan, who has never had a happy (hopeful, angry, 
fearful) experience, what one was like.  
 
Open-ended Questions:  
1) Please describe this past happy (hopeful, angry, fearful) situation to me. What 
was it like to be happy in this situation?  
2) What happened in this situation to make you feel happy (hopeful, angry, fearful)?  
3) Why did these things make you feel happy (hopeful, disgusting, fearful)?  
4) How did you know that you were happy (hopeful, angry, fearful) in this situation?  
5) What did it feel like for you to be happy (hopeful, angry, fearful) in this situation?  
6) What did you do in this situation where you were happy (hopeful, angry, fearful)? 
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2. Imagery Technique (Study 2-Study 4)  
Instructions:  
 
I'd like to ask you to think of two events where you felt most angry (happy, hopeful, 
fearful). Please picture these events in your mind.  
 
Try and remember as truthfully as you can what these most angry (happy, hopeful, 
fearful) events were like. Think of what happened to make you feel so angry (happy, 
hopeful, fearful), and what it felt like to be angry (happy, hopeful, fearful) in these 
particular events.  
 
Please click the “>>” button below when you are ready and have these two angry (happy, 
hopeful, fearful) events in your mind.  
 
Open-ended Questions:  
1) Please try and remember two events that made you feel most angry. Briefly describe 
these two events in your mind.  
 
2) Among the events that you described on the previous page, please choose the one 







3. Emotion-inducing News Stories: Batkid in San Francisco (Study 2-Study 4) 
Our Hero! Batkid Saves the Day in San Francisco 
 
 
Batkid is the superhero name of Miles Scott, a five-year-old kindergartner and cancer survivor who is 
currently in remission. 
 
Miles, whose family lives in the Bay Area, has been battling leukemia since he was 2 years old, more than 
half his short life. He's in remission, and hopefully will stay that way. 
 
Miles loves Batman, and his parents wrote to Make-A-Wish asking for them to help turn their son's fantasy 
of crime fighting into a reality - or as much of a reality as possible. Amazingly, the foundation took on the 
family's request, and with the help of social media, they were joined by thousands of volunteers and 
supporters who wanted to help make the little boy's dreams come true. 
 
Miles, dressed in uniform as Batkid, spent the day on Friday, November 16 traveling throughout the city of 
San Francisco - we mean Gotham - stopping The Riddler and The Penguin as thousands of people cheered 
him on. He rode in a Batmobile, and was given a key to the city by the mayor. 
 
Everyone was enchanted by Batkid, and helped the fiction become more and more real. President Obama 
gave a shout-out to the tiny superhero, and the U.S. Attorney's office even released a fake press 
release indicting The Riddler and The Penguin for kidnapping and conspiracy. 
 
Several of the actors who have played the superhero on the big and small screen, including Michael 
Keaton, Adam West, Christian Bale, and soon-to-be-Batman Ben Affleck, have even expressed their 
support of Gotham's tiniest hero. 
 
The plan was to give a little boy, one who had been through so much, a day of joy. Everyone who 
participated in Batkid's exploits, or watched them from the sidelines, on the livestream, or on Twitter 
(where #SFBatkid was a trending topic), was able to experience the same joy that comes when people come 
together to do something wonderful for someone else. 
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4: Emotion-inducing News Stories: Avery Walker over Leukemia (Study 2-Study 4) 
Another Child in Leukemia Trials Ecstatic Over "Total Remission" 
 
The seventh child to receive an experimental leukemia therapy at Children's Hospital of Philadelphia got 
good news last week: It worked. 
 
"Avrey Walker is cancer free!!!! A total remission!" her father, Aaron, exulted on their Facebook page. 
 
The 9-year-old from Redmond, Ore., was diagnosed at age 4 with acute lymphoblastic leukemia, a blood 
cancer that can be deadly within a few months if not treated. 
 
Like other children in the study at Children's, Avrey had undergone years of intermittent chemotherapy, 
only to relapse each time the toxic treatments ended. She was one of the minority of children who do not 
respond to conventional treatments.  
 
Aaron Walker and his wife, Christal, turned to Children's after reading about Emily Whitehead, the first 
child to receive the hospital's genetically engineered therapy, made using each patient's disease-fighting "T 
cells." Emily remains in remission, a year after treatment. 
 
Avrey and her parents spent about 50 days in Philadelphia while her T cells were modified, multiplied, and, 
a month ago, returned to her bloodstream. The therapy involves transferring genes into T cells - the soldiers 
of the immune system - to make them recognize and attack B cells, the blood component that turns 
malignant in certain leukemias and lymphomas. 
 
Still, the T-cell therapy is showing startling effectiveness, judging from both scientific and parental 
accounts: Of the first seven children, five had a complete response - no evidence of cancer - although one 
of them later relapsed. One child did not respond, and one child's outcome has not been made public by 
parents or doctors. Also, an adult leukemia patient treated with the T-cell therapy remains cancer-free two 
and a half years after treatment. 
 
Children like Avrey have never known such a lengthy respite from disease, disability, and dread. 
Now, her father said, she wants to go back to fourth grade, play softball, hang out with her big sister, 
Madison. 
 
"We'll try to get back to a normal life," he said, "something we haven't had for 10 years." 
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5. Emotion-inducing News Stories: Boston Marathon Bombings (Study 2-Study 4) 
Explosions Rock Finish Of Boston Marathon; 8 Killed And Scores Injured 
 
The terrorist attack, near the marathon's finish line, triggered widespread screaming and chaos, shattered 
windows and barricades and sent smoke billowing into the air at Copley Square. 
With thousands of runners still on the course, two bombs exploded near the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon, killing 8 people, injuring at least 144 and turning the city’s most celebrated event into a grisly 
spectacle of shattered glass, blood and screams. 
 
At least 144 people were injured, with at least 17 of them in critical condition and 25 in serious condition. 
At least eight of the patients were children. Video from the scene showed two blasts about 20 seconds apart 
just off the course at the finish. White smoke rose, barriers flew, and throngs of people who had gathered to 
cheer the runners turned and fled in terror. They later reported seeing horrific injuries that included blown-
off limbs and bodies thrown to the asphalt. 
 
“All the sudden there was a massive boom. There was a sort of concussive blow that pushed a lot of people 
back. I could see runners falling in front of me,” said Dave Abel, a reporter for The Boston Globe who was 
about 10 feet from one of the explosions. 
 
“When the smoke started to clear, I could see lots of bodies,” he said. “I could see one woman staring 
vacantly into the sky. I could see a lot of mangled limbs, a lot of blood and shattered glass. It was probably 
the most horrific thing I’ve ever seen.” Larissa Brinkley, who came from Pennsylvania to run the race, said 
people dropped everything and ran the opposite way. Other witnesses described what at first sounded like a 
cannon blast or fireworks. 
 
“Then it went off again. And then all of a sudden we heard people crying and running away,” said Serghino 
Rene, who was a few blocks away. “It was a huge horde of people just running away.” 
The bombs that turned the Boston Marathon into a bloodbath were concocted from pressure cookers loaded 
with nails and ball bearings — killer devices favored by terrorists from New York to Afghanistan 
  
Authorities in Boston found at least two more explosive devices that they were dismantling, Boston Police 
Commissioner Ed Davis said. One unexploded device was found at a hotel on Boylston Street near the 
bomb site and another unexploded device was found at an undisclosed location, 
 
Keating, a Democrat and member of the House Homeland Security Committee, said. He called the 
bombing a "sophisticated, coordinated, planned attack." 
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6. Emotion-inducing News Stories: Breivik & His Complaints (Study 2-Study 4) 
Norway's Mass Murderer Breivik Threatens Hunger Strike for Better Video Games 
 
Convicted Norwegian mass-killer Anders Behring Breivik has threatened to go on hunger strike unless he 
gets access to better video games, a sofa and a larger gym. On July 22, 2011, Breivik, a far-right fanatic, 
killed 8 people in a bomb attack outside a government building in Oslo and later killed a further 69, most of 
them teenagers, when he opened fire at a youth camp on the island of Utoeya. 
 
In the letter, which has a threatening tone, Breivik enclosed a typed list of 12 demands sent to prison 
authorities. The demands include better conditions for his daily walk and the right to communicate more 
freely with the outside world, which he argues are in line with European rights legislation. 
 
He also demanded the replacement of a PlayStation 2 games console for a more recent PS3 "with access to 
more adult games that I get to choose myself" as well as a sofa or armchair instead of a "painful" chair. "I 
only have the right to play less interesting kids games. One example is "Rayman Revolution", a game 
aimed at three year olds," wrote the 35-year-old convicted killer. 
 
Held apart from other prisoners since 2011 for security reasons, Breivik argues that he has the right to a 
wider "selection of activities" than other inmates to compensate for his strict isolation. Breivik also wants 
his standard weekly allowance of 300 kroner ($A55) to be doubled, particularly to cover his postal charges 
from written correspondence. 
 
Other demands include an end to daily physical searches, and access to a PC rather than to a "worthless 
typewriter with technology dating back to 1873". "You've put me in hell ... and I won't manage to survive 
that long. You are killing me," he wrote to prison authorities, threatening a hunger strike and further right-
wing extremist violence. 
 
"If I die, all of Europe's right-wing extremists will know exactly who it was that tortured me to death ... 
That could have consequences for certain individuals in the short term but also when Norway is once again 
ruled by a facist regime in 13 to 40 years from now," he warned, calling himself a "political prisoner". 
 
In the letter dated January 29 he said that since there has not been any real improvement in his prison 
conditions, a hunger strike would be "one of the only" options at his disposal. "The hunger strike won't end 
until the Minister of Justice (Anders) Anundsen and the head of the KDI (the Norwegian Correctional 
Services) stop treating me worse than an animal," he said, adding that he would "soon" make public the 
starting date of his protest action. 
 
He also refers to himself as a "human rights activist." "You seem to think that we -- all human rights 
activists who fight for one fundamental human right (cultural self-determination) -- ... are Nazi monsters 
who should be pushed into suicide," he wrote. Karl Hillesland, acting director of the prison where is being 
held, told that no one is currently on hunger strike there. 
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7. Manipulation Check Items (Pleasant & Certainty Appraisal)  
 
Next, please answer additional questions below based your past situation or event you felt 
described in the previous page.  
 
1. How well did you understand what was happening around you in this situation?  
2. How well could you predict what was going to happen next in this situation? 
3. How uncertain were you about what was happening in this situation? 
4. How unpleasant was it to be in the situation you wrote about in this situation? 
5. How enjoyable was it to be in the situation you wrote about in this situation? 
* 11-point scale: 1. Not at all/ 11. Extremely (Study 1)  
* 7-point scale: 1. Not at all/ 7. Extremely (Study 2-4)  
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Appendix B: Measurement Scales for Study 1-4  
1. The Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher and Wegner 1989) 
We would like to know how you think about certain behaviors. Any behavior can be 
identified in many ways. For example, one person might describe a behavior as “typing a 
paper”, while another might describe the behavior as “pushing keys”.  Yet another 
person might describe the behavior as “expressing thoughts”. 
We are interested in your FIRST IMPRESSION as to what different behaviors mean to 
you. In the next page, you will find a list of behaviors and two different ways in which 
the behavior might be identified. Please select the one that best describes the behavior for 
you. There are no right or wrong answers. For example: 
1).  Attending class 
a. Sitting in a chair  
b. Looking at a teacher 
 
 
1) Making a list 
a. Getting organized/ b. Writing things down 
2) Reading  
a. Following lines of print/ b. Gaining knowledge 
3) Washing clothes 
a. Removing odors from clothes/b. Putting clothes into the machine 
4) Measuring a room for carpeting  
a. Getting ready to remodel/ b. Using a yardstick 
5) Cleaning the house 
a. Showing one’s cleanliness/ b. Vacuuming the floor  
6) Painting a room   
a. Applying brush strokes/ b. Making the  room look fresh  
7) Paying the rent     
a. Maintaining a place to live/ b. Writing a check  
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8) Caring for houseplants  
a. Watering plants/ b. Making the room look nice  
9) Locking a door  
a. Putting a key in the lock/ b. Securing the house 
10)  Filling out a personality test  
a. Answering questions/ b. Revealing what you're like  
11)  Brushing teeth 
a. Preventing tooth decay/ b. Moving a brush a round in one's mouth   
12)  Taking a test  
a. Answering questions/ b. Showing one's knowledge   
13)  Greeting someone   
a. Saying hello/ b. Showing friendliness  
14)  Resisting temptation   
a. Saying "no”/ b. Showing moral courage  
15)  Eating   
a. Getting nutrition/ b. Chewing and swallowing  
16)  Traveling by car     
a. Following a map/ b. Seeing countryside  
17)  Having a cavity filled   
a. Protecting your teeth/ b. Going to the dentist  
18)  Talking to a child   
a. Teaching a child something/ b. Using simple words  
19)  Pushing a doorbell   
a. Moving a finger/ b. Seeing if someone's home 
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2. Likelihood Estimates for Uncertain Events (Study 1)  
Instructions:  
 
We are interested in the fact that there are some life events that many people perceive to 
be very certain and likely. However, there are other events that many people perceive to 
be uncertain and unlikely, such as earthquakes. Compared to other individuals-the same 
sex and age as you-what do you think are the chances that the following events will 
happen to you?  
 
 
1) Having gum problems 
Very 
Unlikely ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
Very  
Likely 
2) Having a heart attack 
Very 
Unlikely ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
Very  
Likely 
3) Being on an airplane that encounters severe turbulence 
Very 




4) Lost at night for more than 15 minutes 
Very 
Unlikely ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
Very  
Likely 
* 11-point scale 
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3. Likelihood Estimates for Uncertain Events (Study 2)  
Instructions:  
 
We are interested in the fact that there are some life events that many people perceive to 
be very certain and likely. However, there are other events that many people perceive to 
be uncertain and unlikely, such as earthquakes. Compared to other individuals-the same 
sex and age as you-what do you think are the chances that the following events will 
happen to you? 
 




1) Catch flu when supposed to be on vacation 
Very 
Unlikely ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 
Very  
Likely 
2) Develop a stomach ulcer 
Very 
Unlikely ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 
Very  
Likely 
3) Develop an excruciating toothache 
Very 
Unlikely ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 
Very  
Likely 
4) Develop arthritis 
Very 
Unlikely ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 
Very  
Likely 






4. Manipulation Check: High- and Low-level Construal Ad (Study 3) 
On the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. 
 
1. The ad message emphasizes the desired effects which the A40's users expect by using 
it. 
Strongly 












3. The ad focuses more on the ideas about the benefits the A40’s buyers achieve by 
using it.  
  
Strongly 
Disagree ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 
Strongly     
Agree 
 
4. The ad focuses more on the ideas about the features A40’s buyers use while doing a 
workout on it. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 







5. Attitudes toward Ad (Study 3) 
How do you feel about the ad message for the Trackstar A40? 
Bad ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Good 
Ineffective ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Effective 
Not Informative ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Informative 





6. Attitudes toward the Brand (Study 3)   
Overall, how do you feel about the Trekstar A40 as an elliptical trainer? 
Bad ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Good 
Not Attractive ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Attractive 
Undesirable ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Desirable 





7. Purchase Intention (Study 3)  
How likely would you be to purchase the Trekstar A40 if you were in the market for 
elliptical trainers? 
Unlikely ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Likely 
Uncertain ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Certain 





8. Product Involvement (Study 3) 
On the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. 
 
1. I have a lot of experience with elliptical trainers. 
 
Strongly 




2. Elliptical trainers matter a lot to me. 
 
Strongly 




3. I get bored when other people talk to me about elliptical trainers. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 







9. Product Knowledge (Study 3) 
On the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. 
 
1. I have a lot of experience with elliptical trainers 
Strongly 




2. As compared to the average person, I would say that I am highly knowledgeable 
about elliptical trainers. 
 
Strongly 




3. I would describe myself as being very familiar with elliptical trainers. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 




10. Attitudes toward Ad (Study 4) 
How do you feel about the ad message for the Pura K380 (Klenp KC480)? 
Bad ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Good 
Ineffective ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Effective 
Not Informative ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Informative 




11. Strength of Preference (Study 4)  
Please indicate your preference for the two vacuum cleaners based on the features in the 
ads by allocating 100 points between them (e.g., 20:80, 50:50, 70:30, 63:37).  
Klenp KC 480 : _____________ 
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